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In Search of the New Sensibility: Susan Sontag Writing on Art in the Sixties 
Nancy Webb 
 
This thesis will offer an in-depth examination of Susan Sontag’s collection of essays Against 
Interpretation with the aim of illuminating the process of writing about art. Echoing Sontag’s own 
aesthetic concerns, this thesis focuses more intently on the form of her writings than their 
content. Her essays are compared to the work of other writers such as Roland Barthes, Clement 
Greenberg and Chris Kraus and contextualized within a mid-century modernist moment of 
ocularcentric criticism. Sontag’s writing style is examined in relation to autobiography, the 
dilution of the self within the text and performative writing modes. This thesis also delves into the 
phenomenological underpinnings of Sontag’s writings, asking: how does the body inform the 
writing process? This line of questioning charts unknown territory by looking at how the use of 
amphetamines affected Sontag’s critical prose, while investigating the cultural importance of 
speed in the 1960s. The essays in Against Interpretation are also measured against the 
concepts of intimacy and eros and how these intersect with feminist discourse, queer 
subcultures and Sontag’s own sexuality. Navigating the terrain of Sontag’s critical prose, this 
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Creeds, parties, public men – you  
cheat 
Principles – I shall forget you and  
heed the fashions of my heart   
Dead gods, I worship you all,  
And churches, and the beauty 
of the devotions of others 
Also the A Minor Quartet and  
rock ‘n roll and 
The throbbing whiskied consciousness 
of Saturday night 
and the lazy clarity of bed late 
Sunday afternoon. 
Spectator and agent, both 
I shall have those pleasures before 
Bodies give way to years and 
I fall to the death which waits for me 
at the bottom of the sky.  
 























Writing about Susan Sontag’s early essays is a way of thinking through writing about art. Writing 
itself as a subject has always been an originary dot on the map – the uncontested starting point. 
Because she is a very well known writer and certified famous person, there is absolutely no 
shortage of literature on Sontag. There is nothing I want less than to burden a pile that is 
already overflowing. In the novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being, Milan Kundera writes:  
 
We have more and more universities and more and more students. If students 
are going to earn degrees they've got to come up with dissertation topics. And 
since dissertation topics can be written about anything under the sun, the number 
of topics is infinite. Sheets of paper covered with words pile up in archives sadder 
than cemeteries, because no one visits them, not even on All Saint's Day.1  
 
The idea of the sad archive (sadder than a cemetery) has urged me throughout this process to 
be more imaginative about asking questions. Sontag herself remarked in the sixties that 
redundancy is the “principal affliction of modern life.”2 At times, this project has veered 
dangerously close to biography, and then it swerved too close to becoming a scaffolding of 
historical context without a core – just bones. 
Deciding to write about writing was a risk. One of the first discussions I had about my 
idea with a faculty member produced the term meta-thesis – a body of art writing about writing 
about art. Because the thesis required substance – a case study – I brought in Susan Sontag’s 
early writings. The essays in Against Interpretation provide a Petri dish of words rippling through 
history. Sontag’s essays also feel substantial; they are hardy enough to withstand prodding and 
diverse enough to hold up against a variety of questions. Some of her arguments, especially 
those relating to interpretation and writing, remain relevant today. Writers continue to cite these 
first texts of Sontag’s to bolster their own ideas now. In addition, Sontag’s fluidity as a writer (of 
novels, essays, films, plays) makes her an ideal case study for the flexibility of the critic. She 
never considered herself an art critic or an academic, yet her trusted words guided the tastes 
and opinions of her readers. Similarly, she held dual citizenship in both the worlds of “high art” 
and popular culture at a time when most critics positioned themselves resolutely on either side. 
One way to approach the question of writing about art in the twenty-first century would 
have been to compile samples of writing by current art critics and assess their effectiveness or 
parse out their strategies. However, the result would have almost certainly been shallow, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 103. 
2 Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1966), 13. 
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distracted and scattered. Plurality and overabundance characterize current writing on art, which 
far outruns its readers – it would be impossible to read it all. James Elkins takes this issue on 
most notably in What Happened to Art Criticism? – the first in a handful of investigations Elkins 
has conducted into this subject matter. In the opening lines of the book, he asserts: “There is no 
way to measure the sheer quantity of contemporary writing on visual art”.3 There is also no way 
to measure the quantity of contemporary writing on other topics such as poetry, travel and 
politics that lends meaning to visual art. As such, terms like art writing and art criticism are used 
provisionally in this thesis – that is, they are used in place of something more accurate and 
more encompassing.  
Elkins’s diagnosis of art criticism: dying, but everywhere. Writing on art proliferates 
aimlessly. Contemporary criticism finds itself in a sustained moment of crisis, evidenced by the 
past decade’s flood of roundtables, conferences and entire volumes dedicated to answering the 
very basic question: how does one write about art?4 The practice of translating the sensual into 
the linguistic seems more fraught than ever, with the rise of the hybrid critic-curator-journalist 
and the concomitant collapse of criticality into praise, the dubious relationship between those 
who write about art and the commercial art market, the obligatory and buffet-style application of 
critical theory and the self-propelling pressure to produce that manifests itself in art criticism for 
art criticism’s sake – operating independently of quality, relevance or demand. This hectic 
ecosystem informed the decision to focus intently on one example, and draw conclusions from a 
contained source. Rather than skim hundreds of art reviews to get an idea of what it means to 
write about art, I am taking Sontag’s essays as precedents for a style of writing that has since 
evolved, but owes much to her. 
This examination of Sontag is more concerned with the form of her writing than its 
content. In her twenties, Sontag asked of herself: “Why is writing important? Mainly out of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 James Elkins, What Happened to Art Criticism? (Chicago, Ill: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), 2. 
4 See Ben Davis’s article in C Magazine’s “Criticism” issue: "Surviving The Crisis," C: International 
Contemporary Art 118 (2013): 12-13; Hal Foster’s follow-up to a roundtable on the crisis of art criticism 
published in October’s Spring 2002 issue, "Post-Critical," October 139 (Winter 2012): 3-8; Grant Kester’s 
recent article “The Device Laid Bare: On Some Limitations in Current Art Criticism,” e-flux journal 50 
(December 2013); Jeff Khonsary and Melanie O'Brian, Judgment and Contemporary Art Criticism, 
Vancouver, BC: Artspeak, 2010 (the print evidence of a panel on art criticism organized by Artspeak and 
Fillip). These are just a handful of recent examples.  
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egotism, I suppose. Because I want to be that persona, a writer, and not because there is 
something I must say. Yet why not that too?”5 As one of her biographers puts it, “Unlike authors 
who write because they have something to say. Sontag writes in order to have something to 
say.”6 And writing became its own project, indeed, “the Project”. In a 1975 interview, she matter-
of-factly states that what fed her decision to divorce her Freudian scholar partner Philip Rieff 
and move to New York to pursue writing was choosing “between the Life and the Project.”7 The 
act of writing, for Sontag, seems to have started out as a generative impulse without a clear 
objective. This seems more in line with the way that artists are perceived at their beginnings. 
Their first experiments are mainly formal; they make things in order to become. The motif of The 
Artist looms large on the horizon, in the same way that the The Writer motif provided Sontag 
with a kind of template. 
Books and essays about writers tend to overemphasize content. When we read about 
artists, we’re inclined to want more than a reiteration of their work’s content. We want 
biographical details, details about the mechanics of making, how they laboured, what informed 
them, who their friends were. But with writers, there is still this insistent focus on content – the 
finished product on the page. Sontag, with her unwavering attention to form, would have 
lamented this. In a journal entry of 1965, she writes about her disappointment in the way that the 
reception of literature lagged behind art. That people couldn’t accept what Gertrude Stein wrote 
for its form, couldn’t get outside of the content and accept the novel as an object: “People who’ll 
take Larry Poons or Frank Stella are mystified by G[ertrude] Stein saying ‘One + two + three + 
four…”8 Again, summoning Stein in her essay “On Style,” Sontag draws attention to the way that 
she manipulates language in order to alter cognition, or guide experience. The repetitiveness of 
Stein’s Melanctha and the use of common monosyllables jolt the reader into a “presentness of 
experience.”9 Although Sontag concludes of Stein’s work: “Every style is a means of insisting on 
something”, this maxim could be adapted to her own work.10 It would be a gargantuan irony to 
over interpret Against Interpretation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Daniel Schreiber, Susan Sontag: A Biography, trans. David B. Dollenmayer (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern 
University Press, 2014), 46. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.,51. 
8 Susan Sontag and David Rieff, As Consciousness Is Harnessed to Flesh: Journals and Notebooks, 
1964-1980 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012), 66. 




What do I mean by form? I suppose it begins with something very rudimentary and 
logical: the essay. The short critical essay. Layered on top of that are sensibility, structure, style, 
tenor. And on top of that, still, are Sontag’s recently published journals, their divulgences, and 
how these things all read together. Content is kind of disposable anyway. In the paperback 
reissue of Against Interpretation, Sontag admits, “Before I wrote the essays I did not believe 
many of the ideas espoused in them; when I wrote them, I believed what I wrote; subsequently, I 
have come to disbelieve some of these same ideas again.”11 She also begins the title essay with 
a Willem de Kooning quote about content being a mere glimpse: “It’s very tiny – very tiny, 
content”.12 Given the tininess of content, the form is probably what first attracts most people, 
unknowingly, to Against Interpretation even decades after its first appearance. Its title is a 
denial, plain and simple, and its essays are laid out cleanly in five sections. Citations are few, 
but each essay pleasurably snowballs into a nexus of interrelated references. Perhaps it is what 
Liam Kennedy calls Sontag’s  “intellectual generalism” that allows her such formal flexibility.13 
Consciously operating outside of any one critical school, untethered to an academic institution, 
her aura as a rogue intellectual was most potent in the anti-establishment sixties and early 
seventies.14 Although Sontag owes the influence of the short essay form to the New York 
Intellectuals, by the time Against Interpretation came out, the independent critic was becoming 
an extinct species. Rapid professionalization gave rise to what Kennedy describes as “a ‘New 
Class’ of intellectual specialists – technical experts, policy advisors and academics” and 
intellectual opinions began to calcify around defined disciplines.15 The content of Against 
Interpretation supplies a pretext for looking closer at its form and the context in which the 
volume was released. In “On Style”, Sontag opines that the content of art is merely the lure that 
engages consciousness; form transfigures it. On the first page of one of her notebooks of 1965, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Susan Sontag and David Rieff, Susan Sontag: Essays of the 1960s & 70s (New York: Library of 
America), 4. 
12 Sontag, Against Interpretation, 3. 
13 Liam Kennedy, Susan Sontag: Mind as Passion (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 4. 
14 Although Sontag only shifted to the overtly political in her public presence and writings in her later 
years, she was openly opposed to the war in Vietnam and left-leaning in the years following the 
publication of Against Interpretation, which cast her as a young, radical intellectual icon of sorts.  
15 Ibid., 12. In 1965, Harold Rosenberg also comments on the effect that professionalization has on the 
arts: “...the essential mark of a profession is its evolution of a unique language or jargon into which it 
translates its subject matter and in which its methods, purposes and relations to other arts and sciences 
are formulated. The more incomprehensible this lingo is to outsiders, the more thoroughly it identifies the 
profession as such and elevates it out of the reach of mere amateurs and craftsmen” in Harold 
Rosenberg, The Tradition of the New (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 64. 
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she taped a piece of paper with the Romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin’s words on it: “to live is to 
defend a form.”16  
This thesis will offer an in-depth examination of Sontag’s early formulation of a different 
kind of critic; one whose subjectivity is fluid, who does not shy away from emotional difficulty or 
subversive topics, who does not bury her words beneath hastily devised theoretical claims and 
who rejuvenated a discussion of the sensual in relation to writing about art in the 1960s. 
Although Sontag’s oeuvre is immense and she has published many well-known works, I will 
focus only on the essays in the collection Against Interpretation, in order to provide a focused 
investigation within a limited space. I aim to contextualize Sontag’s work, while opening up a 
broader discussion about art writing, and as such, a portion of this thesis will be devoted to 
shedding light on the ideologies that informed writing on art of the 1960s.  
Section one, “Against Interpretation” provides a foundation for the rest of the thesis, 
describing Sontag’s first published book of criticism in detail. Section two, “Tender Prose” 
compares the writing approaches of Sontag and one of her primary influences, Roland Barthes, 
with a specific focus on strategic self-divulgence. Section three, “Seeing Is All” contextualizes 
Sontag’s writing within the mid-century modernist trend of ocularcentric criticism, exemplified by 
Clement Greenberg, while addressing sensory hegemonies and questioning whether or not 
modes of sensory input can imprint themselves on the page. Section four, “The ‘Soluble Self’” 
explores the dilution of subjectivity – the extent to which a writer can disappear within a text. 
This section deals with Sontag’s essays as the runoff of novels-in-progress and how she 
engaged with the artists, filmmakers and writers that she wrote about the way that a novelist 
inhabits her own characters, dissolving into her subjects and transcending the self through 
writing. Sections five and six – “The Writing Body” and “Speed” – delve into the corporeal and 
phenomenological underpinnings of Sontag’s writing, asking: how does the body inform the 
writing process? Sontag’s writings are also discussed in relation to performance theory. “Speed” 
extends the line of questioning initiated in “The Writing Body” to the implications of writing on 
drugs, charting unknown territory by looking at how Dexamyl affected Sontag’s critical prose and 
the cultural importance of amphetamines in the 1960s. Section seven, “Intimacy” reveals the 
roots of disinterested modernist criticism, its Kantian undertones, and how it still bleeds into the 
practice of writing about art today. This section also takes on the question of whether 
subjectivity denigrates seriousness, focusing on this question’s feminist entanglements by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Sontag and Rieff, As Consciousness, 125. The passage is composer Anton Webern quoting poet 
Friedrich Hölderlin. This information provided by David Rieff in an editor’s note.	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engaging Chris Kraus’s I Love Dick in a comparative study. The final section, “Eros”, orbits 
Sontag’s famous call to “an erotics of art”, probing the relationship between aesthetics and 
erotics, especially in the context of Freudian revisionist theories of the fifties and sixties. This 
section also pulls from Sontag’s “Notes on ‘Camp’” and “Jack Smith’s Flaming Creatures”, 
ruminating on her relationship to queer subcultures and her own sexuality. We will begin by 
permeating the outer layer of Sontag’s critical writing, with an introduction to the collection of 






























I’ve checked out three different copies of Susan Sontag’s Against Interpretation from the library. 
The first was a Delta edition with a cracked green cover and rounded white art deco lettering. 
The second was a generic copy of the Farrar Straus and Giroux edition, rebound in black. The 
third is an early Dell Publishing Co. edition; its flaking cover is pea soup-coloured and its 
eponymous first essay has been heavily annotated with pink highlighter, pencil and blue and red 
pencil crayon. Pages four and five are inflamed with red splotches, where words have been 
singled out and enclosed in scarlet bubbles: “obtuse”, “onerous”, “insensitive”, “innocence”, 
“theory”, “consciousness”, “stuck”, “nuisance”, “code”, “translation”, “interpretation”. The 
sentence fragment “dangerous emotions” has been underlined and a deliberate red stake driven 
between the two words. Down the right side margin of page five, the page where Sontag 
deflates the authority of interpretation, wild scratches vertically spell out “FUCK SERIOUS” (figs. 
1 and 2). 
Since its initial publication in 1964, “Against Interpretation” has sparked strong feelings in 
those who have something invested in the act of interpretation – artists, writers, students, 
scholars. Sontag’s original call to spruce up dusty modes of interpretation is a rebellious siren 
song, leading writers down a mutinous path. As Cynthia Ozick remembers it in her obituary for 
Sontag, “Against Interpretation” “was less a summons to hedonism (though it was that too) than 
it was a denigration of history.”17 It is also, contradictorily, an example of doctrinaire exposition 
coming from a writer fresh out of an Ivy League education and eager to make a name for herself 
among the pantheon of Serious Modernist Critics. An intoxicating mix of structure and revolt, the 
essays in Against Interpretation were written between 1962 and 1965 and cover a broad range 
of topics in art, literature and film, much like Roland Barthes’s Mythologies. A few of the major 
artistic phenomena discussed are: French New Wave films; Alain-Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie 
Sarraute and the New Novel; Allan Kaprow’s Happenings; Jack Smith’s film Flaming Creatures 
and the pop culture miscellany that Sontag famously groups under the heading “Camp”. The 
collection is divided into five sections. Section one contains the title essay and “On Style,” an 
underrated bit of writing that deftly maneuvers through the themes of style vs. stylization, 
content, criticism, ethics vs. aesthetics and the will. Section two is devotional; Sontag directs her 
attention to other writers and intellectuals including Cesare Pavese, Simone Weil, Albert Camus, 
Michel Leiris, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Georg Lukács, Jean Genet and Nathalie Sarraute. Sections 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Cynthia Ozick, The Din in the Head: Essays (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2006), 5. 	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three and four focus on theatre and film, respectively – both demonstrating Sontag’s ability to 
transcend medium as a critic and deliver broader meanings to readers regardless of their 
familiarity with the stage or screen. The fifth and final section of Against Interpretation is more 
loosely organized around cultural shifts and budding artistic phenomena such as evolving 
attitudes toward sex and sexuality in popular culture and the move away from medium-
specificity in art engendered by Happenings. Overall, the essays speak to the artistic, political 
and social currents of the decade, signaling a tension with certain established systems of 
interpretation and aesthetic sensibilities.  
The essay “Against Interpretation” originally appeared in 1964 in The Evergreen Review, 
an avant-garde literary magazine (fig. 3). In it, Sontag calls for a reassessment of the role of the 
critic in light of the dulling of sensory capabilities. She traces a brief history of art and the project 
of interpretation, from art as mythical or spiritual, to art as mimesis, to the symbolism and 
translation of religious texts and images in late classical antiquity, to her contemporary moment. 
Sontag ultimately takes issue with what she identifies in art, literary and film criticism as the 
“hypertrophy of the intellect over sensual capability” – an aggressive desire to excavate content 
in order to unveil meaning.18 This process, she contends, deprives an artwork of its immediacy. 
In her essay, she labours over the differing values of form and content, and how each 
affects interpretation. Content, she argues, is vulnerable to interpretation, whereas form – if it is 
constantly changing – can sidestep interpretation and classification. She identifies 
“programmatic avant-gardism” – an evasive avant-garde in perpetual motion – as the solution to 
the devitalizing effects of interpretation, along with more attention to form and new vocabularies 
for describing form that take into account temporal and spatial elements. This was a prescient 
observation in the sixties, when so much of the art and criticism scene in North America was still 
centered primarily on painting and vision.19 For example, Sontag goes beyond the purely ocular 
in her essay “Happenings: An Art of Radical Juxtaposition”, paying close attention to the 
treatment of time in these fleeting artistic spectacles, remarking: “Happenings are always in the 
present tense.”20  
Sontag compares the frenetic, impersonal and polluted modern experience (specifically 
related to urban living) to the equally polluted critical sphere, congested with the noisy chatter of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Sontag, Against Interpretation, 7. 
19 With the exception of a few critics. For example, Harold Rosenberg, who was beginning to outline a 
critical sensibility based on painting as process. 
20 Ibid., 266.  
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critics endlessly layering interpretations that obscure a more lucid experience of art. Specifically, 
she critiques Marxist and Freudian methods of interpretation, which assume that the text, event 
or object is meaningless without interpretation, arguing that a reliance on prescribed models of 
interpretation only indicates an ignorance of the immediacy of experience.  
Sontag’s resistance to an overtly ocular and theoretical form of criticism represents a 
break from the critical tradition of the New York Intellectuals and The Partisan Review. While it 
is difficult to circumscribe a cohesive group, the New York Intellectuals included writers such as 
Lionel Trilling, Irving Howe, Mary McCarthy and Philip Rahv who were bound together by similar 
intellectual concerns and similar views on communism (which later mutated into anti-
communism). The art critics Clement Greenberg and Harold Rosenberg are often annexed to 
this group as well. Most of the New York Intellectuals began as literary critics, but ushered in a 
generalist style of cultural criticism that came to define postwar intellectual activity in America. 
Sontag was often referred to as a successor to Mary McCarthy (earning the nickname “The 
Dark Lady of American Letters”) in a predominantly male intellectual-literary circle. However, 
Sontag experienced both generational and ideological clashes with the New York Intellectuals 
early on, who themselves were struggling to keep pace with the development of modernism and 
were stubbornly tied to all things literary. Meanwhile, Sontag began widening her critical sphere 
by writing about emergent and experimental art forms. Evocative of this shift was her call to “an 
erotics of art” at the end of “Against Interpretation”.  
Against Interpretation as a collection is not a canonical academic text. Rather, its parts 
have been splintered and parsed out to meet the needs of individual specializations – “Notes on 
‘Camp’” has been revisited by gender studies and queer theory scholars, “The Imagination of 
Disaster” and “Jack Smith’s Flaming Creatures” among others populate film studies syllabi and 
“Against Interpretation” makes occasional appearances in introductory art history courses. In the 
context of art history, Sontag’s later work is more commonly summoned, particularly in order to 
enrich an understanding of photography and the ethics of looking – for example, On 
Photography (1977), Illness as Metaphor (1978), AIDS and Its Metaphors (1989) and Regarding 
the Pain of Others (2003). Liam Kennedy suggests that reticence among academics toward 
teaching Sontag’s earlier texts stems from a suspicion about the “universal intellectual” or non-
specialist writer.21 Because of its unusual structure and equivocal content, Against Interpretation 
as a collection has been underutilized by art historians. However, there are lessons for aspiring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kennedy, Susan Sontag, 13.  
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art writers enfolded in its pages. Its varied subject matter, jumping from film to literature to visual 
art, is like an early crash course in sharpening attention in the face plurality. 
It is through Sontag’s recently published journals that I came to know her essays more 
intimately. I found the journals gripping in their candour – although, all writing undeniably goes 
through a vetting process, a sloughing and polishing routine that would in this case include 
Sontag’s son David Rieff’s editorial decisions. Sontag’s journals are the necessary counterpart 
to her essays. This is because the essays focus on what is external to Sontag – art, film, 
literature – and the journals turn the critical eye inward, analyzing sensations, relationships, 
mental states. Combined, these outputs form what Kennedy calls: “an intellectual self-
examination made public.”22  
Read in tandem, the essays and journals intensify one another. A defining feature of 
Sontag’s way of understanding the world begins to reveal itself. She has a desire to shell 
experiences and phenomena – to isolate form, or give form to feeling. This is a process of 
mitosis, a delicate splitting that is almost imperceptible. One example, in 1964 Sontag writes in 
her journal “Loving = the sensation of being in an intense form. Like pure oxygen (as distinct 
from air).”23 In the same journal, Sontag describes smell as “All accent, no syntax.”24 In the 
essay “On Style,” she asserts: “In almost every case, our manner of appearing is our manner of 
being. The mask is the face.”25 This way of structuring experiences is undoubtedly a residue of 
Sontag’s early studies in philosophy at Harvard. She pares things down to their primary 
elements and separates them in order to illuminate their lesser-understood parts. Thoughts, 
objects and sensations are peeled apart from their vehicles – perception, bodies, language. 
What is left exposed is the site of incision. One question that drives this exploration of Sontag’s 
writing is: how was this way of thinking revealed in her criticism, specifically in the essays in 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Kennedy, Susan Sontag, 3. 
23 Sontag and Rieff, As Consciousness, 6. 
24 Ibid., 16.	  
25 Sontag, Against Interpretation, 18. It should be stated that Sontag’s intellectual formation did not occur 
in a bubble. For example, this particular passage seems indebted to sociologist Erving Goffman’s The 




I experience the writing as given to me – sometimes, almost, as dictated. I let it 
come, try not to interfere with it. I respect it, because it’s me and yet more than 
me. It’s personal and transpersonal, both. 26 
– Susan Sontag, As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, 1964 
 
I’m anti-autobiographical. 27   
– Susan Sontag to Sigrid Nunez, Sempre Susan, 2011  
 
In the introduction to the second set of his mother’s published journals, David Rieff mentions 
that Sontag was entertaining the idea of writing her autobiography. This was unlike her, he says, 
as “she was someone who always preferred to write as little as possible about herself directly.”28 
The autobiographical, instead, is mobilized less explicitly in Sontag’s critical writing. The 
personal gurgles up through the cracks of polemic. For example, Rieff claims that there is 
almost nothing of Sontag in her 1978 book Illness as Metaphor, but there is plenty of her. There 
is a driving erudition and a desire to clarify, to give voice to illness, which speaks from behind so 
many other masks. Although it is never acknowledged explicitly, Sontag was undergoing 
treatment for breast cancer during the time that she wrote the book – the subjective seeps in. 
Because the autobiographical in Sontag’s critical writing is impossible to measure or 
authenticate, it is perhaps more productive to look at how her writing style echoed other writers’ 
experiments with subjectivity in the postwar era. Specifically, I have chosen to focus on the 
consonance between Sontag’s and Roland Barthes’s approaches to critical writing, as Barthes 
was for Sontag a long-lasting and important influence. Barthes was also, like Sontag, a writer for 
whom the subject of writing itself was crucial. Some of these consonances have been gleaned 
from Barthes’s writings published after Against Interpretation and, as such, it would be 
anachronistic to deem those texts influences. However, rather than providing a succinct timeline 
of influences here, I aim to draw out Barthes’s writerly characteristics that may have begun as 
influences, but developed over time in tandem with Sontag’s own growth as a writer. There is a 
continuity in the closeness with which each regards their reader.  
In The Object of Performance: The American Avant-Garde Since 1970, Henry M. Sayre 
gathers Barthes and Sontag under the umbrella of what he terms critical performance, a new 
approach to critical writing that sought to overturn disinterested formalist criticism in the sixties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Sontag and Rieff, As Consciousness, 38. 
27 Sigrid Nunez, Sempre Susan: A Memoir of Susan Sontag (New York: Atlas & Co, 2011), 27. 
28 Sontag and Rieff, As Consciousness, vii. 
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and seventies by allowing subjectivity to enter writing by way of performance. Instead of critics 
bestowing meaning onto artworks from a purportedly fixed critical stance, writers like Sontag 
and Barthes proposed a more relational interpretive strategy, one that relied on the artwork to 
elicit a set of performed, malleable responses from the critic. Barthes often explicitly compared 
writing to performance, while according to Sayre, across the Atlantic, Sontag also prompted a 
turn toward critical performance with “Against Interpretation”. Sayre’s apt description is worth 
quoting at length: 
 
That essay ends with a call for a new relation to art based on the immediacy of 
art’s experience as opposed to the questionable permanency of its content. “We 
must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more. In place of a hermeneutics 
we need an erotics of art.” This is a profoundly anti-New Critical position, one 
which shifts our attention away from the art object per se in order to focus on our 
responses to it. To many it seemed to promise only the most profoundly 
subjective kind of criticism and threatened to atomize the experience of art so 
completely that the necessity for criticism itself would become obsolete. It 
seemed narcissistic and self-indulgent – it was anything but. What almost every 
reviewer of Sontag failed to understand at the time – just as they later failed to 
understand the similar sense of self-indulgence apparent in a work like Roland 
Barthes by Roland Barthes – was that Sontag was above all else a writer, 
someone whose thought enters the public forum in order to be heard, debated, 
tested against other responses. It was this dialogue which Sontag wished to 
inspire, the spirited dialogue of convictions deeply felt. “Against Interpretation” 
was against a much more truly narcissistic criticism that claimed to have the final 
word, to fix meaning, to close discourse. Sontag was asking that art be allowed to 
live on.29  
 
The seductive mix of subjectivity, writing and art made for a kind of cloaked autobiographical 
criticism practiced by both Sontag and Barthes. In The Pleasure of the Text, Barthes formulates 
his own subjectivity as being “at the conclusion of a very complex process of biological, 
historical, sociological, neurotic elements (education, social class, childhood configuration, 
etc.).”30 This process of the art writer making avowals before sinking into a topic (unveiling their 
own position) continues to be utilized effectively by art writers and theorists today.31  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Henry M. Sayre, The Object of Performance: The American Avant-Garde Since 1970 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 250.  
30 Ibid., 253.	  
31 One example that comes to mind is the prologue to Amelia Jones’s Seeing Differently: “I grew up a 
white middle-class girl in the American South, in Durham, North Carolina, with parents who were good 
Second World War-era ‘Roosevelt liberals’…” Amelia Jones, Seeing Differently: A History and Theory of 
Identification and the Visual Arts (New York: Routledge, 2012), xxiii. Another example is Lucy Lippard’s 
The Lure of the Local (New York: The New Press, 1997).  
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Crucially, neither Barthes nor Sontag intended to be explicitly autobiographical in their 
criticism. As François Cusset points out in French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & 
Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States, American readers discovering 
Barthes in the eighties connected him with “autobiography, criticism as confession, and 
homosexual literary style,” even though these characteristics (according to Cusset) were 
“antithetical to Barthes’s sense of discretion, his aversion for doxa, and his habitually indirect 
and periphrastic approach to sexual issues.”32 The vastly contradictory information available 
pertaining to the question of whether or not Barthes’s or Sontag’s writing was autobiographical 
leads one to question the definition of autobiographical as a descriptor for criticism in the first 
place. No standardized measure exists for how many divulgences, uses of the first person or 
references to personal history add up to a critical practice certifiably autobiographical in nature. 
Applied to Sontag and Barthes, the term autobiographical signifies lived experience 
aestheticized – intimate pasts, urges, thoughts, wishes organized around outside experiences, 
or mobilized to make sense of artworks, films, books and cultural phenomena.  
Barthes’s Mourning Diary is stylized grief. Written after his mother’s death, it unravels a 
narrative of loss in sparse, aphoristic fragments. If Sontag’s journals, Reborn and As 
Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, form the visceral substructure of her public essays, 
Barthes’s Mourning Diary does the same for Camera Lucida. Photographic theory and mourning 
are mutually supportive, hewn together by tenderly crafted prose. It sounds like a critique, but 
Barthes aestheticized pain well – or as one reviewer put it, he “ached, elegantly.”33  
Along with a veiled autobiographical impulse, the other Barthesian strategies that found 
their way into Sontag’s writing are: list-making as argument-building; detailed taxonomies; a 
fondness for short forms and devotion to the aphoristic, compressed essay style; and an interest 
in muting the lines between fiction and criticism. Sontag also inherited from Barthes the impulse 
to mix the critical with the sensual. In her introduction to A Barthes Reader, she reminds us that 
Barthes constantly compared reading to eros, writing to seduction. He was on one hand a 
calculating structuralist and semiotician and on the other a pleasure-seeker, finding intellectual 
stimulation everywhere (a generalist), but especially in the folds and minute details of a subject 
(e.g. the choreography of a wrestling match in the essay “The World of Wrestling”, or the almost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 François Cusset, French Theory How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual 
Life of the United States (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 285. 
33 Dwight Garner, “Wallowing in Grief Over Maman,” New York Times, October 14, 2010, accessed May 
28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/books/15book.html. 
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imperceptible formal patterns of a writer’s work, as in “Flaubert and the Sentence”, “The Last 
Happy Writer”, On Racine). 
Barthes opens writing up to the senses, remarking in his inaugural lecture at the Collège 
de France that “writing is to be found wherever words have flavor (the French words for flavor 
and knowledge have the same Latin root)[...] It is the taste of words which makes knowledge 
profound, fecund.”34 Sontag’s appeal to an “erotics of art” in Against Interpretation is called to 
mind here, and is relayed by Barthes’s claim in an excerpt from The Pleasure of the Text that 
“pleasure is continually disappointed, reduced, deflated, in favor of strong, noble values: Truth, 
Death, Progress, Struggle, Joy, etc.”35 Although Sontag sometimes got stuck in the gears of 
high moralism and capital S Seriousness, Against Interpretation is brimming with pleasure. In 
“One Culture and the New Sensibility”, she proclaims that “the purpose of art is always, 
ultimately, to give pleasure,” argues for “the space of pleasure” in Jack Smith’s film Flaming 
Creatures, discusses Robert Bresson’s desire to get beyond the pleasure of “physical beauty 
and artifice” and move toward a “pleasure which is more permanent, more edifying, more 
sincere,” problematizes Simone Weil’s ascetic “contempt for pleasure,” argues that the current 
era’s “greatest artistic pleasure is in self-laceration” in reference to the “metatheater” of Jean 
Genet and Samuel Beckett, and warns that the rapidity of innovation in art during the sixties 
may trounce the pleasure of familiarity.36  
As a critical strategy, Sontag learned from Barthes to seek out the unpopular, the 
unfamiliar and the new, or to refresh the familiar. There is an undeniable emphasis on being 
descriptive over being tyrannical when it comes to judgment and interpretation (of artworks, 
literature, etc.). Writing is not just a vehicle for critical judgments, but has a sensibility of its own 
– what Barthes refers to as the “metalanguage” of criticism. Sontag’s introduction to Against 
Interpretation echoes Barthes; she defines her writing as “meta-criticism”, describing it as an 
attempt to reveal the skeletal matter of judgments and taste. A self-reflexive criticism 
undermines its own activity, chipping away at its intrinsic assumptions and patterns. The writing 
refers to itself, always. It advances on the page in its own shadow. 
In Consuming Pleasures: Intellectuals and Popular Culture in the Postwar World, Daniel 
Horowitz draws an interesting parallel between Sontag and Barthes – that both writers boldly 
foregrounded pleasure and sexuality in their analyses of popular culture (Sontag in “Notes on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Susan Sontag, ed., A Barthes Reader (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 465. 
35 Ibid., 411. 
36 Sontag, Against Interpretation, 303, 231, 192, 51, 138, 100.	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‘Camp’” and Barthes in Mythologies). Horowitz also brings to light that although Barthes’s 
Mythologies was published in France in 1957, the first English translation did not appear in 
North America until 1972. This means that Sontag played an integral role in introducing 
Barthes’s distinct style of writing and analytical approach to popular culture to English-speaking 
audiences in America in her essays of the sixties. Horowitz implies, through the reproduction of 
vastly different American and European texts, that American intellectuals held more 
conservative opinions about the place of popular culture in academia and in scholarly 
publications. This places Sontag once again in between cultural traditions. The pluralistic and 
sometimes opposing influences in her writing of the sixties link her to the process of montage. 
Walter Benjamin thought of The Arcades Project as “literary montage”. He writes: “I needn’t say 
anything. Merely show….the rags, the refuse – these I will not inventory but allow, in the only 
way possible, to come into their own: by making use of them.”37 Similarly, the manner in which 
Sontag takes up the material objects of culture – the perfumed handkerchiefs and Flash Gordon 
comics and Tiffany lamps – and turns them over in her hands, affording them careful analysis 
before translating their various significations into words, bears resemblance to both Benjamin’s 
and Barthes’s attention to detail and “montage” method of elucidation. Indeed, there is 
something distinctly literary about Sontag’s criticism (in her mind, the essays were always 
subordinate to her novel-writing), but we only glimpse Sontag the person in brief flickers, in the 
interstices of a swiftly-moving curtain of montaged references. Her essays function similarly to 
the way she characterizes Barthes’s: slipping between autobiography and fiction, dissolving the 
distinction between the essay and the novel – ultimately, muting the boundaries between critical 
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Seeing Is All 
Body type: 
Tall 
Low blood pressure 
Need lots of sleep 
Sudden craving for pure sugar (but dislike desserts – not a high enough 
concentration) 
Intolerance for liquor 
Heavy smoking 
Tendency to anemia 
Heavy protein craving 
Asthma 
Migraines 38 
– Susan Sontag, As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, 1964 
 
Three photographs. The first one: Susan Sontag in a wool duffel coat on a grey day in New York 
City in 1965, with David (fig. 4). Mother and son become vulnerable bruises before Diane 
Arbus’s lens, just like the rest of the photographer’s cast of forlorn characters. “Anybody Arbus 
photographed was a freak”, Sontag would later say in On Photography.39 Upon first viewing, the 
photograph immediately reminds me of second similar photograph of Roland Barthes as a child 
in his mother’s arms (fig. 5). A few weeks after I make this association, I read the following 
passage in Sigrid Nunez’s memoir Sempre Susan: “[Susan] showed me a photograph that she 
cherished, the young Roland Barthes with his mother: already quite a big boy at the time and 
thus a little comical to behold, aloft in the arms of maman, long legs dangling. Roland Barthes, 
one of Susan’s greatest literary heroes [...] had lived with his mother till the day she died.”40  
With Sontag, the person is difficult to extricate from the writer. She attempts to carve out 
a rift between the two. But is this division necessary? Imagine the other titan critics of the 
postwar period, living in their skins and writing from within this wrapping. Greenberg seems to 
have lectured from above somewhere, a disembodied voice, assuredly listing dictums of taste 
and quality. Now, the third photo: Greenberg, Jackson Pollock, Helen Frankenthaler and Lee 
Krasner at the beach in 1952. Greenberg sits between Pollock and Frankenthaler, leaning 
toward the camera (fig. 6). Bald, pale, squinting – hopelessly fleshy and human.  
Greenberg eliminates the body entirely from the art critical process in his essay 
“Sculpture in Our Time”: "The human body is no longer postulated as the agent of space in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Sontag and Rieff, As Consciousness, 19. 
39 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977), 35. 
40 Nunez, Sempre Susan, 99. 
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either pictorial or sculptural art; now it is eyesight alone, and eyesight has more freedom of 
movement and invention within three dimensions than within two."41  
In her book Eyesight Alone, Caroline Jones describes Greenberg as “obsessed with the 
visual.”42 For Jones, Greenberg’s visual fixation unmistakably communicated the motivations of 
mid-century American modernism: to isolate, bureaucratize and commodify the senses. The 
hegemony of eyesight lent itself well to the interpretation of popular art forms at the time, 
particularly colour field painting, which legitimized a kind of sensory channeling (sensory 
information pared down to visual purity). As Jones and many other scholars have commented, 
bodies and sensory experiences became increasingly controlled in the postwar years. The rapid 
advancement of technology and the affordability and availability of mass-produced household 
goods (particularly in the United States) reconceptualized norms of hygiene, cleanliness and 
beauty. Enter the airtight body, the polished body, the odourless body.  
As Jones explains in a follow-up essay to Eyesight Alone, published in the exhibition catalogue 
Sensorium: Embodied Experience, Technology, and Contemporary Art, “At mid-century in 
particular, modernist technologies of the self targeted ever more finely the way sense data were 
to enter those portals [of the body]: modes of hearing and thinking, smelling and tasting, feeling 
and seeing.”43 Perfume, sound-proofed buildings, artificial flavouring – Jones ruminates on 
several examples like these, which signalled the modern drive to organize, separate and 
commodify sensory experiences, avoiding the chaos of a muddled sensorium at all costs. This 
process of division also solidified “an ocular moment” in which Greenberg must have been at 
home, writing as an adolescent that he felt “contempt for everything I hear, see, smell, eat and 
feel.”44 Vision afforded curmudgeonly Greenberg what touch and smell, for example, couldn't: 
distance. The formalist reliance on vision meant both critical distance (disinterested judgment) 
and physical distance from the body (looking as disembodied thought).  
In “Re-Viewing Modernist Criticism,” Mary Kelly reiterates Greenberg’s totalizing theory 
of the senses, noting that in his 1961 essay “Modernist Painting,” he ordains: “Visual art should 
confine itself to what is given in visual experience and make no reference to any other orders of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism, ed. John O’Brian, 4 vols. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1986-1993), 59. 
42 Caroline A. Jones, Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg’s Modernism and the Bureaucratization of the 
Senses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 6. 
43 Caroline A. Jones, Sensorium: Embodied Experience, Technology, and Contemporary Art (Cambridge, 
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experience.”45 Such were the conditions under which one of the most influential modernist critics 
experienced art and wrote about it.  
Greenberg’s vision-centred approach is rooted in a Kantian formulation of aesthetics, 
which collides with a distinctly modernist style of criticism. Amelia Jones explains that this model 
requires contradictorily that the critic make both subjective and universal judgments while 
maintaining a patina of “disinterestedness” in their writing – a requisite attitude for being taken 
seriously and maintaining the illusion of neutrality.46 The objective purity of the modernist critic’s 
position (stripped of personal identifiers) mirrors the formal purity that Greenberg assigns to 
abstract painting. Purity manifests itself as non-figurative visual information and results in an 
experience of aesthetic immediacy. A modernist picture, for Greenberg, “succeeds when its 
identity as a picture, and as pictorial experience, shuts out the awareness of it as a physical 
object.”47 This experience presents itself as exceedingly cerebral – of the eyes and the brain, 
transcending the body almost entirely. The work of art – or more specifically, for Greenberg, the 
abstract painting – is non-functional. It does not participate in the world; it barely constitutes a 
physical object in space. 
In 1965, Sontag writes in her journal: “Eye an incarcerated organ – open to 
blandishments – doesn’t grab, demand immediate satisfaction.”48 In an entry from the previous 
year, she describes smelling as giving “one a knowledge of sensation rinsed clean of thought 
(unlike hearing and seeing).”49 Smell has no content, it is an accent, a hue. It does not register 
cognitively in the same way that vision does. Language is hung upon things perceived visually 
and gives meaning to form. Smells activate nameless sensations and memories. In Eros and 
Civilization (1955), Herbert Marcuse points out that smell and taste are senses of excess, 
“proximity senses” that are most prone to repression and taboo, but also the most emancipatory 
senses.50 Freud also cast a murky shadow on these senses, connecting them to vulgarity, bodily 
pleasure and sexuality. As the co-author of a book on Freud and an avid reader of Marcuse 
(whose work sparked in her a special interest in the politics of eroticism), Sontag’s focus on 
smell and the less-discussed senses was no coincidence. She plainly acknowledges histories of 	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sensory regulation in the essay “One Culture and the New Sensibility”: “But it is important to 
realize that human sensory awareness has not merely a biology, but a specific history, each 
culture placing a premium on certain senses and inhibiting others.”51 Of course, Sontag was not 
alone in wondering about the reciprocity between aesthetic forms and human sensations.52 This 
question had occupied philosophers in the field of aesthetics long before Sontag’s essays 
surfaced, and in the early fifties the philosopher Susanne Langer had dissected the sensed 
qualities of forms extensively in her book-length philosophical theory of art Feeling and Form. 
Although Sontag doesn’t mention Langer in Against Interpretation, the congruity of their views is 
striking. Both advocate for the transparency of artworks – seeing a work for what it is, beyond its 
interpretations, beyond discourse. Langer reinvigorates intuition as a viable form of reasoning or 
cognition, while Sontag yearns to translate a directness of experience in her writing.53  
 Because it would be impossible to survey Sontag’s entire intellectual field and arsenal of 
influences in the space of this thesis, I have chosen to highlight postwar attitudes toward art and 
embodiment by way of a comparison between two different, but not adversarial critics. 
Greenberg rises to the challenge here, playing foil to Sontag, but only because his critical style 
provides the sharpest counterpoint to Sontag’s.  
The rigidity of Greenberg’s prose begs the question: is the road from ocular perception to 
writing perhaps more concrete or restrictive than from, for example, olfaction? Were the patterns 
of Greenberg’s mainly visual perception reflected in his style of articulation? Does the syntax 
match the mode of sensory reception? Caroline Jones begins to answer this question in her 
analysis of Greenberg’s prose, particularly his essay “Louis and Noland” of 1960: “…for the eye 
to sense the threadedness and wovenness of the fabric underneath...The effect conveys a 
sense...of color as somehow disembodied, and therefore more purely optical.”54 Evident in this 
passage, says Jones, is the way that Greenberg distills tactile materials (thread) into abstract 
qualities (“threadedness”). Materiality is severed from its relationship to the body (what it feels 
like) and “subsumed in the optical” – flattened, neutered, purified.55  	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Greenberg’s essays on Abstract Expressionism stress the non-function of art. He states 
that abstract art should strive for a purity of experience, a “disinterestedness” that stands in 
contrast to modern life in America – to its speed and productivity: “I think a poor life is lived by 
anyone who doesn’t regularly take time out to stand and gaze, or sit and listen, or touch, or 
smell, or brood, without any further end in mind, simply for the satisfaction gotten from that 
which is gazed at, listened to, touched, smelled, or brooded upon.”56 In this rare moment of 
introspection, Greenberg negates his adolescent asceticism and echoes Sontag’s appeal to art 
as sensory salve. However, while he presents abstract art as a disembodied escape for the 
overworked senses, Sontag proposes a sharpening of the senses, a conscious re-engagement 
with them. This seems to parallel the two approaches to writing as well: Greenberg as an arbiter 
of taste at a cool distance, and Sontag as the sensualist entrenched in the moment. 
Greenberg’s writing style is direct, unadorned and self-isolating. While Sontag’s writing 
reaches outside of itself to form networks of references and pay homage to influences, 
Greenberg’s tends to be more hermetic, referring repeatedly to a limited arsenal of influences. 
Sontag’s ability to find the new in art and explain artistic phenomena in relation to the cultural 
moment in Against Interpretation stands in contrast to Greenberg’s attempt at a summary in the 
essay “Avant-Garde Attitudes: New Art in the Sixties” (originally delivered as a lecture at the 
University of Sydney on 17 May 1968). In this text, Greenberg seems out of touch. His focus is 
again, limited primarily to painting and sculpture. Anything outside of these mediums is 
dismissed as “Novelty art.”57 In order to provide some cohesiveness to the pluralistic sixties art 
scene, Greenberg concludes that all art can be categorized as either good or bad and that these 
judgments are reached by a consensus of taste. He notes that the conflation of high art and 
popular art only adds to the confusion of the situation.  
Conversely, Sontag resists the drive toward consensus and instead labels her method 
“case studies of my evolving sensibility.”58 She carves out the veins of her own artistic and 
cultural preoccupations and lets arterial routes form independently. Eventually the blood pools 
and her words gain potency through the support of readers, other writers and artists. Her early 
essays oscillate between a modernist moral seriousness and an irrepressible appetite for 
sensual pleasure. Sontag’s initial critical views weren’t so different from Greenberg’s, devoted to 
the self-contained, self-validating art object. However, the two approaches fissure with respect 	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to the sensorium – Greenberg wants to mute it, Sontag yearns to flood it pleasurably. Through 
the essays in Against Interpretation, she seems to advocate for a hyper-awareness, the 
conscious attunement of a broad range of senses – making the whole self, the whole body 
vulnerable to undulations of sensory information. She compares a Happening to “a firecracker 
going off dangerously close to one’s face” and a Supremes song to the “feeling (or sensation) 
given off by a Rauschenberg painting.”59 This multi-sensory mode of interpretation stood in 
contrast to the prevailing modernist ocularity and prefigured a shift toward more embodied forms 
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The “Soluble Self” 
The self is a text – it has to be deciphered...The self is a project, something to be 
built. 60   
– Susan Sontag, Under the Sign of Saturn, 1980  
 
I have a wider range as a human being than as a writer. (With some writers, it’s 
the opposite.) Only a fraction of me is available to be turned into art. 61 
– Susan Sontag, As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, 1964 
 
A tension between disclosure and restraint runs through Sontag’s early writings. In the above 
quoted passage from her journals, she imagines the writing self as a resource that can be 
drained. How much of the writing self can be drained before it ceases to be recognizable as the 
self at all? Like a blood transfusion, how does the material subsumed by the writer change her 
very constitution? In her essay ‘“This temptation to be undone’: Sontag, Barthes, and the Uses 
of Style”, Sarah Garland explores the notion of solubility in relation to Sontag’s writing process. 
Sontag, she argues, always aspired to transcend the self in her texts, to allow aesthetic 
experience and sensory stimuli to dissolve the authority of the writer. Garland notes that this 
process begins with contemplation, which according to Sontag, “entails self-forgetfulness on the 
part of the spectator: an object worthy of contemplation is one which, in effect, annihilates the 
perceiving subject.”62 Early on, Sontag manages to write personally revealing essays while 
avoiding the use of the personal pronoun “I”. Perhaps this omission is an attempt at camouflage. 
In a journal entry of 1965, she writes: “Who has the right to say ‘I’? Is that a right that has to be 
earned?”63 She compares the consciousness that steps outside of itself, the writer witnessing 
herself writing, to Sartre’s autobiography, Les Mots – “I am playing the part of myself”, Sontag 
writes.64 In his critical biography of Sontag, Liam Kennedy also notes the “performative” and 
“provisional” qualities of her early essays (the performative will be addressed more fully later in 
this thesis). 
Garland characterizes Sontag’s method as “aestheticist criticism” – “a tradition where the 
artist or writer tries to replace the sense of themselves as originators, hidden behind the text, by 
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a sense of themselves consumed by the text, dissolved and replaced by language.”65 For 
Sontag, there was an impulse to conceal in both her novels and critical essays. 
The author was in the process of getting lost in the mid to late sixties. Roland Barthes’s 
“La mort de l’auteur” was first published in 1968, followed by Michel Foucault’s “Qu’est-ce qu’un 
auteur?” in 1969. French post-structuralists were among the first to ring the death knell in order 
to envision a renewed future for writing. For Barthes, the author returned to a pre-Enlightenment 
function, more akin to mediating – providing a channel through which language could flow. The 
reader’s interpretation of a text fractured meaning into countless pieces, erasing authorial intent, 
and texts became heterogeneous maps: “the text is a tissue of citations, resulting from the 
thousand sources of culture.”66 And like metal shavings coalescing around a magnet, disparate 
meanings and interpretations were seen by Barthes to gather at the site of the reader: “the 
reader is the very space in which are inscribed, without any being lost, all the citations a writing 
consists of; the unity of a text is not in its origin, it is in its destination.”67 This reformulation of 
authorship extracted an enormous amount of power from one centralized point (the writer-
genius) and diffused it into infinite parts. 
Cary Nelson draws a parallel between Sontag’s belief that artworks and experiences are 
fundamentally ineffable, as expressed in “On Style,” and her own desire to hollow herself out as 
a writer, to vanish within her texts. Nelson labels this an “aesthetic of absence,” and theorizes 
that Sontag focuses on absences as sites of self-depletion for the critic.68 Artists leave open 
spaces of interpretation and critics fill them, but in Sontag’s formulation, the critics also dissolve 
in these voids. Of this notion, Nelson asks: “Can it be true that critics consciously or 
unconsciously seek that self-depletion, that artists create not so much a language we can 
understand as a language we can mimic, thereby silencing our own consciousness?”69 The 
appeal to resist interpretation involves stepping back, absenting oneself, or conversely, 
becoming engulfed entirely by the subject at hand. This merger is a complicated one in Sontag’s 
case. Throughout Against Interpretation she demonstrates an ambivalence toward almost every 
one of her carefully chosen subjects. Her essays never involve explicit praise. More often, she 
oscillates between aversion and curiosity. For example, in “Simone Weil,” she describes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Garland, ‘“This temptation,’” 195. 
66 Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in Image / Music / Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1977), 146. 
67 Ibid., 148.  
68 Cary Nelson, “Soliciting Self-Knowledge: The Rhetoric of Susan Sontag's Criticism,” Critical Inquiry 6/4 
(Summer, 1980): 712. 
69 Ibid., 713. 
	  	  
24 
experience of regarding Weil’s life “from a distance with a mixture of revulsion, pity, and 
reverence,” but simultaneously feels “moved by it, nourished by it.”70 The same feeling of 
reticence permeates “Notes on ‘Camp’”. It’s an authorial game of give and take, wherein Sontag 
reveals her own investments in gay subculture and camp aesthetics, while maintaining a 
guarded distance. For example, she repels camp sensibility when she gets too close: “I am 
strongly drawn to Camp, and almost as strongly offended by it.”71 The use of the verb “to draw” 
or “to be drawn to” suggests a pre-existing distance between the writer and her subject that 
disqualifies the possibility of Sontag herself being camp, or relishing in camp sensibility. This 
delicate choreography of identification reveals itself especially in Sontag’s early critical writing. 
As Nelson remarks, “To be convinced by her analysis of a work is to be led to yearn for what is 
not ‘there’ in her prose. It is not unreasonable to see her essays as strategic attempts to work 
out a rhetoric of self-presentation appropriate to a particular topic.”72 Sontag’s identity shifts 
alongside her subject matter, which she ultimately desires to wholly coalesce with. To know the 
self is to abolish the self, to describe art is to name its ineffability and to write is to disappear. 
Solubility in writing is linked to porosity. The porous critic absorbs information as well as 
dispensing it. Because Sontag appears to be in a state of becoming as she writes – uncovering 
parts of her own identity by analyzing books, films and artworks – the process feels shared, 
open. Her criticism does not follow a one-way trajectory, doling out conclusive judgments, but 
stimulates a sharpening of attention. As Sohnya Sayres describes it in her critical biography of 
Sontag: “The living wall of criticism – that distancing that the critic presides over – disappears.”73 
Sontag concurs in the introduction preceding her suite of essays: “Writing criticism has proved 
to be an act of intellectual disburdenment as much as of intellectual self-expression.”74 The act 
of criticism, for Sontag, necessitates a fracturing of the self. Each essay is performed differently 
and each subject is a solvent into which the critic melts, destabilizing the rigid critic-object 
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The Writing Body 
I can hide in the morning under the covers, make myself as small as possible. I 
can even let myself melt under the sun at the beach – it will always be there. 
Where I am. It is here, irreparably: it is never elsewhere. My body, it’s the 
opposite of a utopia: that which is never under different skies. It is the absolute 
place, the little fragment of space where I am, literally, embodied [faire corps]. My 
body, pitiless place. 75  
– Michel Foucault, “Utopian Body”, 1966  
 
All of me is writing to you and I feel the taste of being and the taste-of-you is as 
abstract as the instant. I also use my whole body when I paint and set the 
bodiless upon the canvas, my whole body wrestling with myself. You don’t 
understand music: you hear it. So hear me with your whole body. 76 
– Clarice Lispector, Agua Viva, 1973  
 
I don’t really think – just have sensations, or broken fragments of ideas, when I 
am alone without a means to write, or not writing – or not talking. I write – and 
talk – in order to find out what I think. But that doesn’t mean ‘I’ ‘really’ ‘think’ that. 
It only means that is my-thought-when-writing (or when-talking). If I’d written 
another day, or in another conversation, ‘I’ might have ‘thought’ differently. 77 
– Susan Sontag, As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, 1965  
 
I admire Sontag’s model of contingency. Beyond admiration, I cling to it, because there is no 
other way. And there is no greater agony in writing than feeling the weight of permanence, 
especially when it comes to words. Academics make contributions to knowledge, nail down 
definitions and seal their opinions in print. This, to me, is harrowing. Perhaps I’ve been rewired 
by the velocity of the times. Living with the Internet means accepting the impossibility of 
permanence and completeness. There will always be more to read, to find; oceans of 
information left undiscovered. For a researcher, this is maddening. So, I find solace in 
contingency, in Sontag’s “my-thought-when-writing” method. This is not a new standpoint – 
postmodern and poststructuralist thinking championed a fragmentary approach to knowledge 
and communication decades ago and it has only become intensified and more unfathomably 
fractured since. This model has been useful for destabilizing power. That which is constantly 
moving and changing is impossible to define, subjugate, injure. Making definitive statements 
feels outdated, hegemonic. But writers still pine for those hardy judgments. I am thinking, for 
example, of the satisfying completeness of John Berger’s writing on art, notably this passage 
from his 1986 essay “The White Bird”:               	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…we live in a world of suffering in which evil is rampant, a world whose events do 
not confirm our Being, a world that has to be resisted. It is in this situation that the 
aesthetic moment offers hope. That we find a crystal or a poppy beautiful means 
that we are less alone, that we are more deeply inserted into existence than the 
course of a single life would lead us to believe.78  
 
I recently discussed this essay with other art writers during a residency, and we concluded that 
this kind of universalizing writing would be smirked at if it were submitted to most art magazines 
and journals today. There is a reason for that, but I sometimes wonder what has been lost. 
Writing in broad strokes can be inane or poetic, depending on who is wielding the pen. Sontag’s 
early writing is in constant negotiation between a modernist sensibility (asserting judgments as 
though they were objective truths using straightforward language) and a postmodern intuition 
that destabilizes master narratives. This is in line with Marianne DeKoven’s proposition that the 
pivot between modernism and postmodernism took place in the tumultuous sixties. She argues 
that the countercultural, artistic and radical political movements of the decade formed the 
beginnings of postmodernism, and that during this period, the work of many writers, 
philosophers and artists melded both modernist and postmodernist ideologies. The politics of 
selfhood were churning; a restructuring occurred. A dualistic conception of subjectivity (heroic 
self vs. the hostile world) transformed into a fractured, pluralistic, egalitarian view of the subject. 
 
Knowing has to do with an embodied consciousness... 79 
– Susan Sontag, As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, 1965  
 
What does the writing body need? Some need coffee, some need a good sleep. Sontag: “What 
is the secret of suddenly beginning to write, finding a voice? Try whiskey. Also being warm.”80    
I want to know what happens when we broaden our understanding of the writer to the conditions 
surrounding writing – when we heed Sontag’s advice to not over interpret content, when we 
travel up the tip of the pen through the wrist and into the body and focus on what transpires 
beyond the page. There is something to the corporeal disavowal that occurs in the process of 
writing. The stiffness of academia. The brittleness of research. It seems natural to shift to the 
corporeal in a discussion of Sontag’s writing. After all, the title of her second volume of 
published journals and notebooks is As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, a line borrowed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 John Berger, “The White Bird,” reprinted in Harper’s Magazine (June 2000): 52.  
79 Sontag and Rieff, As Consciousness, 151.	  
80 Susan Sontag and David Rieff, Reborn: Journals and Notebooks, 1947-1963 (New York:  
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 158.  
	  	  
27 
from a journal entry of 1965. The writing mind is housed in the writing body. Consciousness and 
flesh conspire to produce an object. 
 
The texts are objects. I want them to affect readers – but in any number of 
possible ways. There is no one right way to experience what I’ve written. 81 
– Susan Sontag, As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, 1965 
 
The word ‘embodied’ has been appended to unsuspecting nouns for a few decades now; 
‘embodied writing’, ‘embodied art’, for example, or the catchall combination ‘embodied 
practices’. Talk of the body shifted to embodiment as a result of much of Western philosophy’s 
discounting of the body’s role in consciousness. The shift to embodiment also signaled a new 
understanding of the body not just as an object or conglomeration of biological matter, but as a 
way of being. Furthermore, this way of being is entirely subjective. Rather than anonymous, 
featureless bodies, we navigate our relation to the outside world from within a unique sensory 
apparatus. European phenomenologists, Maurice Merleau-Ponty in particular, melted the 
Cartesian divide and reinvigorated the body’s function in relating to the world around us. Most 
notably, in The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty makes a case for subjectivity as 
bound to the body: “the subject that I am, when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body 
and this world.”82 Aided by arch-feminist Simone de Beauvoir’s reworking of Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of phenomenology in The Second Sex, second-wave feminists laid the plans for 
merging embodied (personal) experience with the public and political. Both phenomenology and 
emerging feminist discourse placed importance on the value of individual lived experience, as 
have related identity-focused discourses that followed. This hasty philosophical timeline brings 
us to the use of phenomenology and the adoption of the word embodiment into the 
contemporary theoretical lexicon.  
The residues of phenomenology have been mobilized by performance theorists, feminist 
theorists, queer theorists, critical race theorists and affect theorists to inform a process of 
thinking through the body. Because one of my research objectives is to plumb the relationship 
between the body, subjectivity and writing about art, I have attempted to locate explanations 
from within a matrix of feminist and queer theory and performance studies. Writers in these 
fields have explored writing and embodiment in a way that intersects intriguingly with Sontag’s 
work. 	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Performance studies sprouted out of anthropology, sociology, theatre studies and 
speech-act theory in the middle of the twentieth century and performativity became a defining 
methodology or way of thinking through identity politics in the eighties and nineties.83 J.L. 
Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (originally delivered in the fifties as lectures at Oxford 
and Harvard) introduced speech-act theory, distinguishing between two types of utterances: 
constative (utterances that say something) and performative (utterances that do something).84 
According to Austin, performative utterances literally do the thing that they describe – for 
example by saying, “I promise you,” one is not only saying the words, but also making the 
promise. Austin’s theory provided a starting point from which performance theorists could 
debate the viability of doing things (or performing) with words. Performance studies encompass 
a variety of theoretical concepts, but I will focus only on performative writing. 
In some ways, performative writing is a failed intellectual conceit. Post-structuralism, the 
linguistic turn in philosophy, phenomenology and performance studies all collided and people 
(writers) got excited about what this could mean for writing. Performative writing has a bad 
reputation because no one can define it; by definition, it cannot be defined. It refuses to be 
something specific (a discipline, a strategy, an event), but it also refuses to be everything (total 
experimentation). This elusive rhetoric, understandably, has been frustrating for academics and 
lay readers alike. There have been a lot of intolerable sentences laid down under the banner of 
performative writing, of this there is no doubt, but there are some kernels of original thought that 
still hold promise. Here they are: (1) writing is a performance / the writing identity is performed, 
(2) writing subjects transcend themselves and time and (3) performative writing evades reason, 
linearity and hierarchy. 
In her contribution to the 1998 anthology The Ends of Performance, Della Pollock 
borrows the phrase “reworking the self in its enunciation” from Elspeth Probyn to describe the 
function of performative writing.85 Writing and becoming are equated. Pollock’s self is non-linear 
– it’s anachronistic, unstable. The self that emerges through writing is “a possibility rather than a 	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fact.”86 This flexible notion of selfhood recalls Sontag’s conception of her own writing as both a 
process of “disburdenment” and “self-expression”, as well as both “personal” and 
“transpersonal”. Pollock reveals performative writing’s phenomenological leanings, describing it 
as “an intimate coperformance of language and experience” wherein “the writer and the world’s 
bodies intertwine.”87 Although this explanation is a little bit like a silk curtain blowing in the 
breeze, it does get at a core idea that many writers in performance studies and its auxiliary 
fields believe holds promise. That is, the idea that writing can be as Sontag puts it 
“transpersonal” and cross-temporal; that the words on the page do something (rather than just 
say something) and have some experiential quality.88 This, according to Pollock, occurs when 
the reader reads with you, sees what you see, feels the impression of an image or idea on your 
imagination.89   
In her introduction to the same volume of essays, Peggy Phelan expands on 
performance and temporality: “Part of what performance knows is the impossibility of 
maintaining the distinction between temporal tenses, between an absolutely singular beginning 
and ending, between living and dying. What performance studies learns most deeply from 
performance is the generative force of those ‘betweens.’”90 This non-linear conception of time, 
as it pertains to writing, lends an added depth to Sontag’s willed ambivalence and to the 
enduring lives of her texts. She wrote simultaneously from a canonized literary past (drawing on 
a formidable mental library of influences from childhood on) and in her present moment 
(heralding the new, contouring the current cultural mood). Her performance as a writer is not so 
different from the model of performativity proposed by J.L. Austin, fortified by Judith Butler and 
built upon by theorists like Peggy Phelan. Sontag performs herself as a modernist, a sensualist, 
a queer subcultural icon, a feminist, an aesthete, an elitist, a populist. Butler’s well-known theory 
of performativity defines gender identity as “the stylized repetition of acts through time.”91 That 
is, gender is not innate, but takes shape in the process of its everyday performance. In her 
debut essay on the subject, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution” (1988), Butler invokes 
Simone de Beauvoir’s aphoristic pronouncement: “one is not born, but rather, becomes a 
woman” as well as Merleau-Ponty’s similar injunction that the gendered body is “an historical 	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idea” rather than a “natural species.”92 Both examples uproot stability and highlight the protean 
quality of identities, which are constantly reorganized like the characters in a theatrical 
performance (Butler makes the explicit link between performative acts and theatre in her essay). 
People do gender, much like actors do roles, and Austin’s words do things. Butler continues: 
“the body is not merely matter but a continual and incessant materializing of possibilities. One is 
not simply a body, but, in some very key sense, one does one’s body.”93 This resonates with 
Della Pollock’s conception of performative writing as “a possibility rather than a fact”. Much like 
a body, Sontag’s critical stance is adaptive to its context; her judgments fluid and performative, 
rather than fixed and falsely attributed to a disembodied critical authority. In many ways, her 
essays of the sixties provided a flexible model of authorship, performance and identity that 
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After 25 hours of work (dexamyl – uninterrupted except for an hour with [the 
American journalist Herbert] Lottman and, later, [Godard’s film] Alphaville) I think 
I’ve sorted things out. 94 
– Susan Sontag, As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, 1965 
 
Kif melts the brain; dexemyl (sic) sharpens the edges. 95  
– Susan Sontag, As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, 1965 
 
Susan Sontag took Dexamyl, an amphetamine, from 1964 to 1980. She used it as a “stimulant 
for writing.”96 In London on August 18th, 1964, Sontag writes in her journal: “Dexamyls are 
called, in England, ‘Purple Hearts’ (they’re purple, not green – kids take them 20 at a time, with 
Coke...Then (lunch hour) pop into a ‘cave’ (nobody over 21 admitted) and [dance the] Watusi.”97 
Youth, newness, and quite literally, speed, weren’t merely intellectual concerns for Sontag in the 
sixties, but a shared physiological/pharmaceutical phenomenon. Historian Nicolas Rasmussen 
calls what happened in the postwar years an “amphetamine epidemic.”98 And in his essay on 
Warhol’s factory and amphetamine, Juan A. Suárez describes it as “shifting society into a 
different tempo.”99 He provides as evidence the following passage from Andy Warhol’s memoirs: 
“I could never finally figure out if more things happened in the 1960s because there was more 
awake time for them to happen in (since so many people were on amphetamine), or if people 
started taking amphetamine because there were so many things to do that they needed more 
awake time to do them in.”100  
Amphetamines were the answer to a postwar culture seeking hyperstimulation. 
Prescribed to soldiers in Vietnam and Korea, to depressed housewives, to terminally ill patients, 
or illegally procured by beatniks and artists, speed was ubiquitous. Why did speed become so 
popular in postwar America? Rasmussen suggests that it reflected the cultural shift toward rabid 
consumerism, a kind of imperative to spend (energy, money, time) all driving toward the 
fulfillment of pleasure. He borrows a Foucauldian adage to advance this hypothesis: 
“amphetamine became a crucial ‘technology of the self’ for constituting the healthy postwar 	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consumer.”101 Dexamyl – a combination of amphetamine (stimulant) and barbiturate (sedative) – 
was released in the United States in 1950 and heavily marketed as an anti-depressant and anti-
anxiety medication. It came in pill form – a small triangular blue tablet with a line down the 
centre, vaguely resembling a heart (as in “purple hearts” in the UK). Along with Sontag, Warhol 
was also fond of Dexamyl, and was filling a prescription for speed when he was shot in 1968. 
Rasmussen muses: “Without his speed, Warhol would not fully have been Warhol.”102 Would 
Against Interpretation have been Against Interpretation without speed? It’s impossible to know. 
But the following question still pulses mysteriously: what did amphetamine bring to Sontag’s 
early writing? How did this accelerated mental state imprint itself on the hundreds of pages she 
wrote in the sixties?  
Sontag’s prose is polished. Some sentences are like marble pillars, every part solidified 
in its exact right place. “Every word is the word, chosen with fanatical care and unvarying 
elegance,” writes Craig Seligman of Sontag in his book-length comparison of Sontag and film 
critic Pauline Kael.103 All of those elegant sentences, however, are mobilized toward a swiftly 
unfurling argument, which often loosely assumes the form of a list (as in the numbered 
paragraphs in “Against Interpretation” or the more deliberately enumerated “Notes on ‘Camp’”). 
Sontag sifts through literary, film and pop culture references at breakneck speed, covering an 
overwhelming breadth of topics in her first collection of essays. Her writing advice to Sigrid 
Nunez was: “streamline the prose and get it moving at a faster clip […] If there’s one thing 
modernism has taught us, it’s that speed is everything.”104 And Sontag’s intellectual velocity 
certainly matched the momentum of the decade in which she wrote her early essays. Daniel 
Schreiber recounts in detail the tempo of one day in the life of Sontag, culled from her journals: 
On a single Saturday, for instance, she visits a museum in the morning, rushes in 
a taxi to lunch with friends, then to a theater in the afternoon to see Ernst 
Lubitsch’s 1932 classic Trouble in Paradise. Reading and maternal tasks occupy 
the early evening, after which she goes to the movies again to see a Kenneth 
Anger film and then to a party. Finally, she goes to a midnight showing of a 
Brigitte Bardot film.105 
 
Speed was the truest match for Sontag’s sensibility in the sixties. It attuned concentration, 
provided the stamina needed to see several films a day and deftly navigate intellectual 	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conversations and debates at night. Cabs also helped – she supposedly never took public 
transit despite financial restraints; she couldn’t imagine not arriving precisely on the doorstep of 
where one intended to go. Her journals provide vivid descriptions of the effects of other drugs, 
including kif (cannabis resin) and LSD. Kif, which Sontag tried while visiting a friend in Morocco, 
is described as “Cotton in your head – everything is ‘beautiful’ – you glide toward it, away from it 
[...] I would never work – write– if I took a lot of kif. I feel a loss of energy, And I feel isolated, 
lonely (though not more unhappily so)”, “LSD: everything decomposes (blood, cells, wire) – no 
structure, no situations, no involvement. Everything is physics.”106  
Speed reverberated with the sheer velocity of mid-century modernism – emancipating 
bodies from habitual needs (chief among them sleep) and allowing the subject to keep pace with 
rapid advancements in art and technology, or adapt to the reality of cities that truly never sleep. 
As Caroline Jones explains (implicitly referring to the widespread adoption of prescription drugs 
and other technologies of the self): “mid-century modernism aimed to coax people into adapting 
to the requirements of the socius; the new sensorium provides chemicals that achieve that end 
with far less effort or even (in the case of children) conscious choice.”107 Functioning on a 
combination of Dexamyl, coffee, cigarettes and cabs, Sontag was in some ways an exemplary 
modern subject, adapting to the new requirements of modernist immediacy by modifying her 
own sensory modalities. Although the connection between Sontag’s amphetamine use and her 
writing is almost never discussed (only briefly mentioned in biographical contexts), her self-
denying writing habits would place her comfortably among the legions of writers and artists 
romanticized for subjugating the needs of the body to their work (by way of alcoholism, drug 
abuse, sleep-deprivation, starvation, etc.). Sigrid Nunez recalls Sontag’s punishing writing 
habits: 
She would take Dexadrine and work around the clock, never leaving the 
apartment, rarely leaving her desk. We’d go to sleep to the sound of her typing 
and wake up to the sound of her typing. And though she wished she could work 
in a less self-destructive way, she believed it was only after going at it full throttle 
for many hours that your mind really started to click and you’d come up with your 
best ideas.108  
 
According to Nunez, Sontag agonized over writing and preferred to be out absorbing (at the 
theatre, art exhibitions, social gatherings) than sequestered with her typewriter, especially when 	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it came to her essays. She also had a deep aversion to being alone, and wrote best with 
another person in the apartment, even in the other room. Her apartment was spartan, with 
almost no adornments on the walls, populated mostly by simply made bookshelves crammed 
with meticulously organized and annotated volumes. She almost never cooked; Nunez recalls 
one of the first lunches at Sontag’s when starting out as her assistant, consisting of canned 
cream of mushroom soup and a few cobs of corn scrounged from a near-empty refrigerator. 
Even bathing came second to intellectual pursuits – Sontag reminds herself in a journal entry of 
1961: “Don’t smile so much, sit up straight, bathe every day.”109   
Sontag’s disavowal of her body during the writing process is an interesting counterpoint 
to her insistence on sensual voracity on the page. It is as though she attempted to subordinate 
everything – sleep, food, cleanliness, relaxation, exercise – to The Project (writing), to become 
disembodied in the process itself, the body performing rote functions only (to hold up a book or 
pen, to type). This splicing of corporeal and cognitive activities recalls Caroline Jones’s 
characterization of the modernist tendency to understand the self as a machine, divided 
between body and brain – “the body is a humble servant; thought is free only in the 
transcendence of lowly embodied routines.”110 It is as though when writing Sontag relinquished 
tenancy in her own body, while paradoxically injecting a sense of embodiment – a deliberate 
focus on describing things based on subjective sensory information – into her essays.  
The effects of amphetamine are described as “a deeper immersion into [the world’s] 
rhythms, sounds, and striations,” as opposed to the melting away of the world prompted by 
hallucinogens.111 Sontag’s project in Against Interpretation is unequivocally preoccupied with 
fine-tuning attention. Simplified, her argument is: the senses have been bludgeoned, 
bureaucratized by capitalism. Aesthetic experiences allow us to reinvest in the soma. 
Amphetamine seems to have the dual effect on writers of sharpening one’s awareness and 
stimulating feverish productivity. Kerouac – a stock example – produced On The Road while 
mainly on speed. The final manuscript was one unbroken paragraph on a scroll three inches 
wide and 120 feet long. “On The Road has a nervous, tense and benzedrine feel,” recalls 
Kerouac’s biographer.112 And Suárez agrees, benzedrine or “bennies” likely fueled “the 
rhapsodic descriptions of minute nuances of mood and geography, character, and situation that 	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fill On the Road.”113 Amphetamines were intensifiers for many artists and writers in the fifties 
and sixties (Warhol and Kerouac included) and this sensorial intensification has been archived 
in books, films and other artistic formats. Suárez even makes the connection between the 
amphetamine side-effect of enhanced tactility and the diffuse brand of eroticism introduced in 
Warhol’s films, wherein pleasure is delayed and most explicit sexual content takes place off-
screen. Speed could have a variety of effects on the libido; “in some cases, speed could mean 
sex without genital fixation: a cutaneous intensity distributed over the body and spreading over 
adjoining spaces, props, and materials.”114 The expansion of sexual pleasure across the body’s 
entire surface, the skin becoming a sprawling receptive topography, was also at the heart of 
Herbert Marcuse’s plea to liberate eroticism from its functional and normative strictures. This 
involved an “externalization of libido,” moving away from the “genitofugal” (or “genital 
supremacy”), toward “the eroticization of the entire organism.”115 Reconceptualizing the whole 
body as an erogenous zone, Marcuse proposed that sexualities would become “polymorphous” 
– a Freudian appropriation that also makes its way into Sontag’s essay on Jack Smith’s Flaming 
Creatures: “These are ‘creatures’, flaming out in intersexual, polymorphous joy.”116 Sontag also 
echoes Marcuse’s liberating message in “Psychoanalysis and Norman O. Brown’s Life Against 
Death,” charging Lady Chatterley’s Lover author D.H. Lawrence with a “puritanical insistence on 
genital sexuality” and America with being at “a very elementary stage of sexual maturity” for 
scandalizing the book in the first place.117 Sontag also takes interest in the liquid boundaries 
between bodies and objects in Smith’s film – “the shaken breast and the shaken penis become 
interchangeable with each other” – which recalls Suárez’s characterization of an “amphetamine 
eroticism,” spreading across surfaces infectiously.118 Similarly, Marcuse argues that 
sensuousness is a kind of “receptivity”, a way of being affected by sensations and information 
transferred between bodies and objects, and that this sensory receptivity has been socially 
repressed in favour of rationalism.119  
It would be wildly deterministic to come to a definitive conclusion about how the form and 
content of Sontag’s intellectual output of the sixties was affected by her use of amphetamines. 	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In his related investigation of Warhol, the Factory and amphetamines, Suárez shares this 
methodological concern: “The challenge then is to ground the work in its material circumstances 
without conflating it with them, to show how a certain type of subcultural practice intersected 
with a parallel aesthetic project.”120 So, to make unverifiable claims about speed and writing 
would be unproductive, but to ignore entirely the social and material conditions behind a body of 
writing would also be detrimental – relegating that work to a purely aesthetic or formalist realm. 
It would likewise be unsatisfying to romanticize Sontag’s amphetamine use or simply place her 
among a brooding coterie of writers whose drug use has been mythologized (Coleridge and Poe 
on opium, Baudelaire on hashish, Sartre on mescaline, Burroughs on everything). Rather, like 
other scholars who have approached the question of art making and writing mediated by mind-
altering substances, I want to offer an alternative interpretive channel. As Sontag’s public 
essays and private journals oscillate between carnal and cerebral concerns, it would be an 
oversight to ignore the corporeal conditions of Against Interpretation’s making, especially in 

















 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




I understand writing as an ideally complex form of consciousness: a way of  
being both passive and active, social and asocial, present and active in one’s 
own life. 121  
– Susan Sontag, Notes, “On Writing and Writers”, Date Unknown  
 
“Women novelists lack executive force” ([Columbia University English professor] 
Steven Marcus the other night) – a different relation to their own ego. Prevail 
through sensibility. 122 
– Susan Sontag, Reborn, 1963 
 
It is hard to believe that intimate criticism – that is, a style of criticism that opposes 
disinterestedness and objectivity and is infused with a writer’s own identifications – still rouses 
suspicion.123 As previously mentioned, Amelia Jones has most notably questioned the lineage of 
models for art history and art criticism rooted in an “Enlightenment-based logic of viewing” that 
classifies and hierarchizes objects based on visual information.124 This lineage, Jones asserts, 
is indebted to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, but has been modified and refined by aesthetic 
theorists from Hegel to Fry to Greenberg and beyond.125 The Kantian model of aesthetic 
judgment necessitates the division of mind and body, “clearly distinguishing between 
contemplative, disinterested aesthetic judgment and embodied, sensate, interested, contingent, 
and therefore individualized and non-universal judgments.”126 This elimination of personal 
investment and disavowal of corporeality puts the critic in a position to make authoritative 
judgments. It eliminates vulnerability, uncertainty, contingency and accountability. The critic 
descends upon the art object, dispenses judgment and then vanishes into an amorphous cloud 
of anonymity. This interpretive model appears now and then in art history programs as an 
apparition (of rigid Marxist and Freudian approaches), haunting the bureaucratic processes that 
underlie academic writing. Students are still encouraged to practice explicit reasoning and 
assertive pragmatism in their writing (for example, one is reminded to “contend”, “argue” and to 
“prove”, but rarely to “attempt”, which would display uncertainty or vulnerability). As such, more 	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speculative (as opposed to evidence-based) approaches have been slow to surface in 
academia.  
As is often the case, strategies for writing have lagged behind the subject matter they 
hope to be able to accommodate. While the acceleration of identity-based discourses and the 
disintegration of fixed meanings were two of the major shifts characterizing theoretical 
conversations in art history programs of the mid-to-late twentieth century, the way they were 
written about did not gain equivalent momentum. On the other hand, the rapidly expanding field 
of art in the 1960s – from body art to Happenings – prompted a reevaluation of the critic’s role 
and the importance of subjective opinion. Max Kozloff, an art critic for The Nation and the New 
York editor of Artforum in the early sixties, identified 1962 as the culmination of a crisis in art 
criticism. He cites as proof the deluge of essays on criticism surrounding that year and suggests 
that this renewed interest resulted from a fissure between art and art criticism; as unfamiliar 
modes of art-making began to surface, critics found themselves ill-equipped to discuss them.127 
Harold Rosenberg echoes Kozloff’s sentiment in relation to action painting in The 
Tradition of the New (1965): “Language has not accustomed itself to a situation in which the act 
itself is the ‘object.’”128 Against Interpretation struck at the perfect moment – a moment of 
unease about how to put art and aesthetic experiences into words. Out of this unease came 
productive attempts at rethinking how to write about art, including feminist art criticism, as well 
as critical styles that have explicitly striven to foreground race, ethnicity, class and sexuality in 
the writing process. In the following section I will explore this opening up of the self to the art 
critical process through the example of Chris Kraus’s book I Love Dick, published in 1997. 
Although this takes us over thirty years past the publication of Against Interpretation, I have 
chosen it as a lens through which to look at critical intimacy, as it is a potent example of a text 
that combines emotion, critical judgment, vulnerability, erudition and abjection. Kraus’s book 
dissolves the divide between sterile critical thought and personal disclosure. I Love Dick 
illustrates what I believe Amelia Jones means when she says: “We are embodied, particular in 
our identifications; we are flesh and part of the flesh of the world. As such, we change the things 
we encounter.”129 This analysis sets us up to think about Sontag’s work in a similar way. The 
distinction between public and private (or disinterested and interested) is much less glaring in 	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Against Interpretation than in I Love Dick, but it is this ambiguity that provides for a complex 
case study. Ultimately, this comparison will aid in evaluating the ways in which intimacy and 
criticism intersect, and how this pairing is always a delicate tightrope walk between essentialism 
and honesty.  
Chris Kraus’s experimental novel I Love Dick scales the precipice of destructive self-
exposure. The book, which gained immediate popularity after its publication in the nineties, is a 
collection of letters, journal entries, critical musings, reminiscences and barely fictionalized 
accounts of encounters between Kraus, her then-husband Silvère Lotringer and the cultural 
theorist Dick Hebdige. The expanse of the story is sprawling: Kraus navigates falling in love with 
Hebdige, the intellectual and sexual stimulation that this stirs up in her partnership with 
Lotringer, the failure of her short film Gravity & Grace, schizophrenia and texts on artists 
including R.B. Kitaj, Hannah Wilke and Eleanor Antin. 
Throughout I Love Dick, there is a hyper-attention to the process of writing itself and the 
risks of divulging the intensely personal. Kraus, age 39 when she began writing the book, 
admits that she never allowed herself to write in the first person before: “I had to find these 
ciphers for myself because whenever I tried writing in the 1st Person it sounded like some other 
person, or else the tritest most neurotic parts of myself that I wanted so badly to get beyond.”130 
But in the process of untangling the personal from the philosophical, she legitimizes the 
subjective voice by extricating it from the idea of a fixed self in time – “there’s no fixed point of 
the self but it exists & by writing you can somehow chart that movement.”131 Writing in the 
nineties, she self-consciously refreshes that well-worn slogan of seventies second-wave 
feminism: the personal is political.  In I Love Dick, Kraus lays bare the enduring injunction that 
male theorists can be philosophical about feelings, but with women writers, it is always 
personal, never objective, never social: “Why is female vulnerability still only acceptable when 
it’s neuroticized and personal; when it feeds back on itself? Why do people still not get it when 
we handle vulnerability like philosophy, at some remove?”132  
Kraus’s project is a forthright act of externalization – what poet Eileen Myles describes 
as “a remarkable study in female abjection.”133 It is unapologetically confessional, but probes 
theoretical questions introspectively. Theory, however, as Joan Hawkins points out in her 	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afterword to the 2006 edition of the book, is performed by Kraus, rather than plainly 
articulated.134 Literary and theoretical references and considered hypotheses on art, film, 
sexuality, health and activism convene around Kraus’s subjective experience. There is no 
distinction between the private and public voice, between feeling and philosophy. Hawkins files I 
Love Dick under “theoretical fiction”, explaining that theory becomes a character in its own right, 
it infiltrates the plot: “In Kraus’ ‘novels’, debates over Baudrillard and Deleuze and meditations 
on the Kierkegaardian Third Remove form an intrinsic part of the narrative, where theory and 
criticism themselves are occasionally ‘fictionalized.’”135 This bears resemblance to Sontag’s own 
position at the fault line between criticism and fiction; her criticism is stained with a novelistic 
sensibility. It might be useful to think of fiction-writing and essay-writing as two vessels of water 
presided over by Sontag, whenever one overflows it spills into the other. 
If Kraus is on one extreme end of the scale when it comes to personal disclosure in 
public writing, Sontag hovers somewhere near the other end. But there is something of Kraus’s 
committed free fall into the chasm of self-exposure that derives from Sontag’s early intentions in 
Against Interpretation. In an essay on Sontag, written in response to the publication of her 
journals, critic Dave Hickey offers the following theory of her relationship to self-disclosure and 
vulnerability. From the journals (which he argues have been over-edited to the point of 
defamation by Rieff), Hickey extracts two personae: Sad Susan and Serious Susan. “Sad Susan 
is the ‘sensitive’ one. She loves movies, literature, babies, and interesting women. She speaks 
in the early pages of Reborn, but as the book progresses she becomes increasingly silent.”136 
“Serious Susan is a moral juggernaut,” a fierce intellectual who isolates Sad Susan from the 
world of “dumb fun” and casual sex.137 Serious Susan reprimands Sad Susan for her “dangerous 
streak of tenderness.”138 Ultimately, Hickey interprets the Janus-faced narrative of self-
repudiation in Sontag’s journals of the sixties as a stand-off between “the writer’s disobedient 
body [which] told her a story about freedom and transgression that, ultimately, her mind and 
temperament could not countenance.”139 Hickey’s condescension is predictably offensive, but 
gives a nonetheless evocative account of the balancing act of allowance and disavowal in 
Sontag’s early oeuvre. The moralist and the sensualist collide. But where Hickey’s cowboy critic 	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mode engages and he reduces Rieff’s edited version of Sontag’s journals to “a gay chick lit 
memoir with a few big words,” a more generous reading might welcome the complexity that 
“Sad Susan” offers to “Serious Susan”.140 
Writing to the fictionalized version of Dick Hebdige in I Love Dick, Kraus says of her own 
quasi-theoretical confessions: “You think it’s personal and private; my neurosis...I think our story 
is performative philosophy.”141 She has casually and self-mockingly referred to her genre as 
Lonely Girl Phenomenology – a self-ordained counterpart to Hickey’s Sad Susan? Reviews of I 
Love Dick were similarly reductive in conflating the writer with the person, often focusing on the 
love story or the scandal that followed the book’s publication and completely ignoring the 
theoretical discussions that unfold within its pages. Simone Weil, about whom both Sontag and 
Kraus have written, was also subject to essentializing interpretations that relied too heavily on 
her biography. In Aliens & Anorexia, the follow-up to I Love Dick, Kraus remarks: “Until recently, 
nearly all the secondary texts on Simone Weil treat her philosophical writings as a kind of 
biographic key. Impossible to conceive of a female life that might extend outside itself. 
Impossible to accept the self-destruction of a woman as strategic.”142 In the following section, 
the way that Sontag’s essays were conflated with the intimate details of her life will be explored. 
In the early sixties, the stakes were very high for women who wanted to reveal 
something of themselves – something of their inner lives – in their writing, especially in critical 
writing. In an unfavourable review of the second volume of Sontag’s journals, Simon During 
concludes that the intimacy of the journals tarnished her legacy as a serious critic. He disguises 
his own opinions behind assumptions about Sontag’s goals as a writer: that she strove for a 
“historicist seriousness and nobility” in order to travel passably within a certain early twentieth-
century American intellectual milieu; that a tonal frequency of “seriousness, impersonality, 
formalism” would serve the dual purpose of securing her intellectual esteem and erasing the 
untidy personal aspects of her life.143 The discussion returns to self-transcendence, which 
During interprets literally as Sontag’s disavowal of all things personal (her sexuality, her 
marriage, her child, her heartbreaks) in the hopes of reaching some sterile plateau of critical 
objectivity. While it is undeniable that in her early critical writings Sontag dabbled in a high 	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modernist tone, affecting a moral seriousness approaching irony, the personal remained 
imperative to her judgments. The rawness of the journals works in symbiotic relation to the 
polemical public essays; neither fully consumes, erases or transcends the other. 
According to During, Sontag failed herself. By revealing her “almost continuous state of 
abjection” through the journals, she fails to transcend herself, and thus relinquishes the legacy 
of impersonality.144 Here, seriousness and impersonality in writing are bafflingly equated with 
“political resilience and power.”145 During’s critique stands in for dozens of others that reiterate 
the same stale argument: that subjectivity denigrates seriousness, that self-exposure can’t be 
perceived as anything other than narcissism. Sontag’s abjection is seen to be “contaminating” – 
her inability to erect solid barriers between her “intense personal neediness and confusion” and 
her formal prose is perceived as a failure, rather than a deliberate writing strategy.146 This 
criticism is also dubiously familiar, repeatedly directed at women artists and writers who retool 
subjectivity for political, artistic or philosophical purposes. The early work of the artist Hannah 
Wilke is one example adjacent to Sontag’s writings of the sixties. Reacting against the claim that 
women artists were incapable of making universal (i.e. non-gender-specific) art, Wilke flooded 
her work with the personal, until she drowned out its associations. However, Wilke’s work, such 
as the S.O.S. Starification Object Series (1974-82) in which she poses topless and dotted with 
small labial sculptures, narrowly preceded the acceptance of self-exposure as a critical position 
for feminist artists. As a result, she was ridiculed by critics and labeled narcissistic for her 
experiments with transparent subjectivity. 
In Against Interpretation, Sontag lodges her own subjectivity within the cracks of an at 
times detached voice. She reveals herself through her relation to a floating web of references, 
which expose her investments. While her process of undressing through writing is not as 
abashed as Kraus’s, it hints at the potential for the critical act to be dipped in feeling early on in 
the sixties, at a time when disinterested criticism still prevailed. That Sontag is a uniquely 
polarizing case only further problematizes the delicate balance between detachment and 
investment in criticism. Her writing has been variously described as “intelligence uninflected by 






personality” and “euphoric.”147 In a personal letter to Sontag sent on March 23rd, 1964 (housed 
at her archives) the writer and reviewer for The Partisan Review, Gertrude Buckman, effuses:  
You have an openness and a humanness that I haven’t observed in other 
intellectuals [...] I find your writing persuasive, by virtue, not only of your 
reasoning, the evidence you bring to bear, but a moving sincerity that suffuses 
what you say. This isn’t to be confused – and I’m not confusing it – with a 
humorless earnestness; it springs from a fresh perceptiveness, a real interest in 
what you’re talking about, a real wish to communicate your responses, which are 
delicate and alive.148 
  
The equally “delicate and alive” pages of Against Interpretation espouse the origins of a style of 
criticism that has in subsequent decades gained traction. In her book Hold it Against Me: 
Difficulty and Emotion in Contemporary Art, Jennifer Doyle argues for the infusion of feeling into 
critical writing and interpretive strategies. She urges, “the rhetorical deployment of the personal 
and the emotional should not be assumed to be a retreat into an ahistorical, apolitical self” and 
suggests that the personal and emotional can in fact support meaningful aims. 149  That we 
refuse to allow the personal and the intellectual to intersect, signals a failure. For Doyle, it is 
impossible to take up a critical position “independent of the author’s networks of affiliation, 
friendships, and mentoring relationships, as if it were not informed by his or her points of 
identification, estrangement, and institutional location.”150   
Throughout I Love Dick, Kraus is routinely reminded of her perceived insufficiency as the 
partner of a respected male intellectual (Silvère Lotringer). Indeed, in the final pages of the 
book, after months of letters and meetings with Dick Hebdige, Dick chooses to address his final 
dispatch to Silvère, even cruelly misspelling Chris’s name. Undoubtedly, Sontag came up 
against similar pressures as a writer and intellectual three decades earlier. Her feminist politics 
were complicated and polarizing. Sontag was rarely explicit about her position; presenting a 
“sexually ambiguous image”, she exercised what Angela McRobbie has labelled an 
“idiosyncratic disavowal” of the more essentializing narratives informing early second-wave 
feminism.151 If the use of an exhausted metaphor will be permitted one last time, Sontag 
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doubtlessly shattered a glass ceiling in the sixties, but let a couple of the shards fall on the 
women below. In her essay “Inside the Body Politic: 1980 – Present”, Catherine Lord asks:  
How can one possibly untangle the nomenclature of Sontag's selves as she lived 
through several decades of historical change? Could she have been in the closet 
before the metaphor of 'the closet' came into play? Was she a feminist snob? A 
fag-hag of epic talents? A dyed-in-the-wool modernist with a weakness for Claire 
Morgan’s pulp classic The Price of Salt and any little morsel by Djuna Barnes? A 
bisexual polemicist? A single mom? A dyke caught between breast cancer, which 
she refused to see as either metaphor or punishment, and the so-called gay 
cancer, a metaphor inflicted as genocide?152  
 
The contradictory nature of Sontag’s public image may have aided the process of advancing her 
work in a male-dominated sixties critical milieu, however, she hardly escaped misogyny in those 
early years. Sigrid Nunez retells a story about a reporter asking Sontag to confirm a rumour that 
she was Sartre’s mistress; when asked what it was all about, Sontag responded sarcastically: 
‘What it was about,’ [...] ‘was that a brainy woman must have a brainier man.’”153 In her memoir, 
Nunez meditates on the challenges Sontag must have faced: 
But to think of this proud, intellectually ambitious person coming of age in the 
days before women’s liberation and of the kind of bias she must have routinely 
encountered, one can imagine how galling it must have been. (A partial list of 
those who put her down almost as soon as she stepped out of the gate would 
include Norman Podhoretz, Mary McCarthy, William Buckley, James Dickey, 
Philip Rahv, John Simon, and Irving Howe).154  
 
Considering the context in which she wrote the essays in Against Interpretation, it is astounding 
that Sontag risked divulging anything of herself, offering even a shred of intimacy. Whether 
intentional or not, those early essays infused disinterested criticism with curiosity and 
humanness. Sontag’s early critical writing has a quality to it that is somehow immanently 
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…sexualization of life – seeing the world through a trope, in this case, sexual 
attraction, sexual adventure, sexual failure. 155 
– Susan Sontag, Journal, December 1957 
 
Sensuality and art criticism seem to repel each other to opposite poles. While one gorges on the 
fullness of physical (and sometimes sexual) experience, the other deals pedantically with words, 
prioritizing the visual above all else. When Sontag calls for an “erotics of art” at the end of 
“Against Interpretation”, scholar Guy Davidson proposes that she “fully collapses the sensuous 
with the sexual.”156 The first line of As Consciousness is Harnessed to Flesh, written in May 
1964, reads: “The right hand = the hand that is aggressive, the hand that masturbates. 
Therefore, to prefer the left hand!...To romanticize it, to sentimentalize it!”157 The sexual and the 
intellectual are threaded through Sontag’s private writings explicitly (her journals map an 
inclination to reconcile writing and sex) and less explicitly through her public work as a critic. Her 
swift categorization as a high modernist critic by other scholars has buried an attention to 
sexuality and an engagement with desire legible in Sontag’s early writing on art that break from 
the dictums of disinterested criticism. 
Sontag’s invocation of the sexual in her writing was well in stride with the atmosphere of 
sexual liberation in the 1960s, and echoed the stirrings of a shift toward the corporeal in art 
(foreshadowing a wave of feminist body art). Carolee Schneemann’s Meat Joy, Yoko Ono’s Cut 
Piece and Andy Warhol’s film Blow Job all emerged in 1964, the same year that Sontag wrote 
many of the essays later published in Against Interpretation, including the title essay and the 
controversial “Notes on ‘Camp’”. The fifties and early sixties have been historically framed within 
a “sex-positive movement”, wherein revolutionary politics and an openness toward sexuality 
collided.158 The result was a potent utopian feeling, as Jonathan Katz describes it:  
What was truly revolutionary in the sexual revolution was this push towards a 
single, universal body-in-common. Sexuality, it was held, could dissolve or 
suspend the very physical and social differences that subsequent liberation 
movements understood as inherently divisive. In this early phase of the sexual 
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revolution, sexuality would be the hinge between people, a powerful solvent to 
embodied physical and social differences.159  
 
As such, many artists harnessed the radical potential of the body in their work, moving beyond 
two-dimensional artworks into a broad variety of practices now mainly gathered under the 
banner of performance art. Emancipated from the canvas, these burgeoning art forms sought to 
override modernist ocularity by opening up the experience of art to lesser-utilized senses. 
Schneemann’s Meat Joy infused the room with the fetid aroma of sweat and raw poultry, while 
Paul Thek (the artist and friend to whom Sontag dedicated Against Interpretation) sullied 
minimalist tropes with his hyperrealistic sculptures of waxen flesh slabs. Needless to say, 
Greenberg’s “eyesight alone” approach to art criticism was abruptly invalidated. Surprisingly, 
there is one instance wherein sex does enter Greenberg’s criticism; Caroline Jones explains: 
“‘Feeling is all,’ Greenberg once wrote to a friend, evaluating some particularly good sex; this 
phrase was later abstracted from the event, reemerging after more than a decade to describe 
abstract opticality in modern art.”160 The attempt to infuse aesthetic observations with sexual 
force, in Greenberg’s case, does not quite carry the same significance as in Sontag’s. 
Characteristically, he let the sentiment calcify over ten years before rinsing it of any bodily 
association and applying it to abstraction. In the case of Sontag’s criticism, eroticism, sexuality 
and subjectivity play a more palpable role. 
I want to resist setting up a binary. Plainly, Sontag’s criticism is not solely cerebral, nor 
sensual. Rather, thinking is carnal. Sensuality is smart. As Mark Greif notes in his review of 
Reborn: “Anyone who thought [Sontag’s call to an ‘erotics of art’] meant throwing analytic 
intelligence out with the hermeneutic bathwater was disabused. Philistinism or superiority, for 
her, lay in the quality of mind manifested in one’s sensuous reaction. If you couldn’t think – think 
well, think quickly, think like Sontag – then you didn’t feel.”161 Sontag did away with boundaries 
as a teenager; after her first night hurtling through San Francisco’s gay scene with Harriet 
Sohmers, she composed the following buzzed backseat rumination over the Golden Gate 
Bridge: “I watched the bay and felt warm and alive...I had never truly comprehended that it was 
possible to live through your body and not make any of these hideous dichotomies after all!”162 	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This attention to the sensuous bathes the essays in Against Interpretation. Take for example, 
her defense of Norman O. Brown’s Life Against Death and Herbert Marcuse’s Eros and 
Civilization in which she argues: “Disenchantment is the characteristic posture of contemporary 
American intellectuals, but disenchantment is often the product of laziness. We are not 
tenacious enough about ideas, as we have not been serious or honest enough about 
sexuality.”163 Or, in her lavish descriptions of Jack Smith’s film Flaming Creatures (a film 
avoided by most of her contemporaries and charged with obscenity): “Very studied visual effects 
(lacy textures, falling flowers, tableaux) are introduced into disorganized, clearly improvised 
scenes in which bodies, some shapely and convincingly feminine and others scrawny and hairy, 
tumble, dance, make love.”164 Or, in her description of Resnais’s Muriel: “Here, a strong emotion 
– the pathos of erotic frustration and longing – is raised to the level of a meta-emotion by being 
set in a place that has the character of an abstraction…”165 These early essays are infused with 
what Greif describes as “an odd, partly disowned, seemingly extraneous but electrifying 
language of sex.”166 Sontag’s intertwining of eros and intellect was not entirely coincidental. In 
fact, it was well in stride with theoretical shifts occurring at mid-century, rooted in Freudian 
revisionism, such as Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization, Brown’s Life Against Death and R.D. 
Laing’s The Politics of Experience. 
Marcuse’s book seems to have been in the back pocket of every student, artist, left-wing 
scholar and political radical in the late fifties and early sixties. Its dual focus on the repressive 
force of alienated labour and the liberating potential of sexuality was a potent mix that became 
emblematic of a decade. Marcuse, Brown and Laing all rallied against the perceived decay of 
sensory capacity in America, and helped to change attitudes toward pleasure, which led to a 
wider embrace of mass culture. If work, for Marcuse, is the deferral of pleasure, then art and 
popular culture, for writers like Sontag and Barthes, is the re-introduction of pleasure into a life 
of sensory and libidinal repression. For Marcuse, artistic creation is the only example of labour 
that does not pit sexuality and social utility against one another. This notion certainly holds up 
against Sontag’s own model of artistic labour as an autonomous writer whose work engages 
directly with the sensual. Eros and Civilization begins with a critique of capitalism that calls for 
the undoing of “the somatic and mental mutilations inflicted upon man,” reminiscent of Sontag’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Sontag, Against Interpretation, 258.	  
164 Ibid., 230. 
165 Ibid., 239. 
166 Greif, “Still Superior.” 
	  	  
48 
own comments in Against Interpretation regarding the desensitization of the body and mind.167 
Marcuse’s re-imagination of sexuality as “polymorphous” and fantasy as “chiefly against normal 
sexuality” were perhaps early attempts to articulate the cultural and artistic manifestations of the 
sexual revolution. Again, Jack Smith’s Flaming Creatures comes to mind, and as previously 
mentioned, Sontag’s description of the film’s writhing bodies finds a conceptual foothold in 
Marcuse’s influential text.168 “Notes on ‘Camp’”, as well, effuses sexuality and from the moment 
of its publication has aroused a clamour of opinions about its correlation to queer subcultures of 
the sixties and Sontag’s personal sexual life. 
“Notes on ‘Camp’”, first printed in The Partisan Review in 1964, has become an 
essential text in the gender studies/visual culture/queer theory matrix. It is steeped in ambiguity 
and controversy for the way that Sontag navigates sexuality and aesthetic sensibility. “Notes on 
‘Camp’” embodies a dual existence: having one original written form anchored in its historical 
moment, and another independent life as a cultural phenomenon that continues to mutate as we 
struggle with its major subjects including camp, irony, seriousness, performance and how 
gender and sexuality relate to gestures, objects, tastes and representation. It is written in an 
aphoristic style and plays out as a struggle between the writer’s inner modernist and 
irrepressible sensualist. Sontag’s essay is abundant with contradictions as she rifles through a 
bottomless personal inventory of pop culture, literary and film references in order to assemble a 
sensibility that she associates with historical aristocracy and “homosexual taste.”169 Most of the 
scholarship on Sontag in relation to sexuality (her own or of those she wrote about) that exists is 
centered on this particular piece of writing. Many scholars, including Terry Castle, have 
attempted to read “Notes on ‘Camp’” for its latent autobiographical qualities, framing it as a kind 
of sly coming-out. Castle argues that the “mock didacticism” of the essay is meant to 
strategically obscure its autobiographical undertones, especially those details that point to the 
sexuality and personal desires of its author.170 She views “Notes on ‘Camp’” as both a 
“backhanded confession” that Sontag eschewed in later years and “a complex hello to an 
absent yet much-desired unknown.”171 This “unknown” recipient of Sontag’s message was 
perhaps the sexual “other” – the drag queens, queer artists, camp performers and sexual 	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‘deviants’ of 1960s New York. Castle’s idea of the “absent yet much-desired unknown” repeats 
in a sense what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick identifies in the discourse of camp as “camp-
recognition”: 
…camp-recognition doesn’t ask, “What kind of debased creature could possibly 
be the right audience for this spectacle?” Instead, it says what if: What if the right 
audience for this were exactly me? What if, for instance, the resistant, oblique, 
tangential investments of attention and attraction that I am able to bring to this 
spectacle are actually uncannily responsive to the resistant, oblique, tangential 
investments of the person, or of some of the people, who created it?172  
 
Sedgwick situates camp in a network of recognition based on “reader relations” and “projective 
fantasy.”173 When Sontag describes the “haunting androgynous vacancy behind the perfect 
beauty of Greta Garbo,” “the exaggerated he-man-ness of Steve Reeves” and the 
“melodramatic absurdities of most opera plots” is she appealing to a specific reader?174 
Transmitting hidden messages? Confronted with these questions, it is tempting to conflate the 
critic and the person, or the writing and the writer. In a diary entry of 1959, Sontag mystifyingly 
self-identifies as queer, writing: “Being queer makes me feel more vulnerable. It increases my 
wish to hide, to be invisible – which I’ve always felt anyway.”175 She consciously maneuvered 
around her sexuality in her professional practice as a writer and in her personal life. It is not that 
they were kept separate, but they were both shrouded equally in a strategic ambiguousness that 
made it possible for her to publish a risky essay like “Notes on ‘Camp’” in 1964. Sontag’s early 
example hints at the possibility for a different formation of the critic; one whose subjectivity is 
fluid – evades fixity. 
In the essay “‘The Closet of the Third Person’: Susan Sontag, Sexual Dissidence, and 
Celebrity”, Guy Davidson qualifies Sontag’s early essays as “a kind of closet” in that they 
articulated identity while simultaneously obscuring it: “Sontag embeds queerness in seemingly 
sober and impersonal prose.”176 While the metaphor of the closet is too loaded to map directly 
onto Sontag’s essays, some elements of “Notes on ‘Camp’” mimic the form of detached 
commandments, particularly her numbering of camp characteristics. There is also a feeling of 
reticence that permeates the essay, wherein she reveals her own investments in gay subculture 
and camp aesthetics, while maintaining a guarded distance. Was Sontag’s reticence an early 	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manifestation of her ongoing mandate of sexual ambiguity? Or was it a much more matter-of-
fact decision reflecting the pressures of building a viable career as a woman and critic in the 
1960s, when writing about non-normative sexual practices marked one as either this or that, as 
serious intellectual critic or outsider?177  
It is useful to look at the interplay of obscuring and revealing in Sontag’s “Notes on 
‘Camp’” as a precursory attempt at destabilizing objective or distanced criticism. Her text is 
riddled with codes and specific cultural minutiae that are more easily translated by certain 
readers than others. Whether she intended it or not, “Notes on ‘Camp’” contributed to a growing 
queer vocabulary, which was defined largely by the strategic act of omitting or 
disguising. Richard Meyer identifies this language as “the parlance of homosexual camp.”178 
These coded utterances or slang terms were crucial to protecting details about speakers’ 
intimate sexual lives. A sixteen-year-old Sontag was already studiously observing “gay slang” in 
her journal, scrawling the following entry in 1949: 
“gay” 
“a gay boy” 
“a gay girl” 





“he’s very jam” 
“I lead a jam life” 
“a jam friend of mine” 
“I’m going normal” 
“drag” 
“be in drag” 
“go in drag” 
“a drag party”179  
 
The unavoidable question is: how do the personal details of Sontag’s life – her sustained 
interest in gay subcultures, her polymorphous sexual history, her close friendships with and 
support of gay artists – structure the way that we look at her criticism? Does her membership in 
queer networks of the 1960s art world function as a badge of legitimacy and belonging or allow 
her to speak for others? The way that Sontag has been rebuked for what D.A. Miller calls a 	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“phobic de-homosexualization of Camp” provides a case study for grounding the above 
questions.180 Miller and other critics of “Notes on ‘Camp’” (also Andrew Ross) have argued that 
Sontag’s ambivalence about homosexuality – for example, her claim that “if homosexuals hadn’t 
more or less invented Camp, someone else would” – was a strategy for “de-gaying” and 
depoliticizing queer modes of representation.181 While the details of Sontag’s personal life are 
not sufficient to downplay her ambivalent treatment of the homosexual subject in “Notes on 
‘Camp’”, they do enrich an understanding of her text and complicate the question of whether or 
not her views were “phobic”. The majority of arguments directed at Sontag’s articulation of 
sexuality in the essay are gay male-centred. Anne Pellegrini draws attention to the question of 
queer female camp in Sontag’s text: 
To my mind, Sontag’s de-homosexualization of camp is neither a matter of 
simple homophobia (whatever that is) nor the closet (whether imagined as 
internalized homophobia, necessary self-protection, or canny careerism) […] 
Sontag was hardly the only feminist, then or now, straight or queer, to express 
reservations about gay male camp’s “woman question.”182  
 
Reading “Notes on ‘Camp’” from a queer feminist point of view, with female desire in mind, 
opens the text to a greater depth of analysis – rather than stunting it with the charge of de-
homosexualization and homophobia. In an interview in 1975, quoted in Pellegrini’s article, 
Sontag reveals: “camp taste for the theatrically feminine [helped] undermine the credibility of 
certain stereotyped femininities – by exaggerating them, by putting them between quotation 
marks.”183 Perhaps, then, “Notes on ‘Camp’” can be seen as an experiment in subtly articulating 
patterns of non-normative sexuality and desire (not limited to the gay male experience), within 
the formal boundaries of the critical essay. There is an intimacy to the way that Sontag writes 
about camp – a kind of closeness that allows for mutual identification. As Sontag reminds us in 
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In early December 2014, I watched icy, barren Montreal shrink into the distance and landed in 
humid, fragrant Los Angeles, spending three delirious days engrossed in Sontag’s archives, 
which reside at UCLA. The collection is immense, housing everything from manuscripts to love 
letters, postcards to leather-bound journals, hand-written marginalia to French press clippings. 
Each day, I walked from a quiet residential borough southwest of Beverly Hills to the university’s 
Westwood campus, passing on my way manicured lawns, elaborate cacti gardens, shaded 
mansions, burnt clay roofs and tall palm trees like lanky teens. Susan Rosenblatt became 
Susan Sontag at age 13, when her widowed mother remarried and moved the family to Los 
Angeles; she attended high school in North Hollywood, reading Gide and Rilke in her free time, 
and even studied at UCLA briefly before transferring to Berkeley.185 Hours melted away as I laid 
the ephemera of a life out in front of me, tucked away in a cool, dimly lit room at the Charles E. 
Young Research Library (a modernist structure designed by A. Quincy Jones and opened in 
1964, the same year many of Sontag’s first essays were published). Overwhelmed by the 
volume of information, I attempted to adhere to three research mantras: do not romanticize the 
subject, do not assume the objectivity of archival documents, and do try to go beyond the text 
(Sontag’s essays, as the focus of my research, in this case).  
Afforded the privilege of plumbing the archives, I hoped to get a better understanding of 
her process as a writer, the trajectory of her essays and her underlying inspirations. I was also 
interested in accounting for what had been omitted from the published journals edited by 
Sontag’s son, David Rieff. To my surprise, Rieff seems to have published the most intensely 
personal bits of Sontag’s journals and left a significant portion of the vocabulary lists, reading 
agendas and intellectual notes behind. Her notebooks and journals of the late fifties – kept while 
living in Paris – reveal extensive, almost obsessive lists of cafes, theatres, radio stations, 
magazines, book stores, churches, gay bars and French vocabularies for everything from drink 
names to bird species, penned in Sontag’s small and neat but imperfect handwriting. I examined 
several drafts of the essays featured in Against Interpretation, looking for a map of Sontag’s 
writing approach, only to find wispy stacks of onionskin paper essays heavily marked up, 
without any changes to their core sentiments. The editorial process seems to have been 
arduous, but generally pedantic. Even though I peered into the intimate spaces of Sontag’s life 
and followed a breadcrumb-trail of references that seemed to align with her intellectual concerns 	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of the sixties (letters from Norman O. Brown, a postcard from Harold Rosenberg, etc.), I 
remained on the surface. I found no distinct treasure, no hidden gem. Ruminating on this 
experience over the past several months, and revisiting the photographs and notes I took while 
at UCLA many times, the value of my visit to archives has finally materialized. Rather than 
concealing in their folds the secrets of a life, the materials in Sontag’s archives prove that she 
lived publicly through her work. Each journal entry, letter and draft from the sixties merely 
confirms what Sontag’s essays bodied forth elusively – an interiority made public.  
Researchers rarely discuss ambivalence. But in this case, ambivalence is key – it 
harmonizes with Sontag’s own project as a writer, and also with her credo as a judge (of 
artworks, literature, people). Set down your impressions in the moment, let them be guided by 
the senses, write from within yourself but constantly adapt that self to your circumstances. 
Opinions flake away over time, but Sontag has managed with Against Interpretation to ensnare 
readers born decades apart with the pulsing vitality of her essays. In this thesis, I have 
attempted to delineate what it is that makes these writings special; what qualifies them as both 
precursors to the broadening of critical styles and beacons of light in art criticism’s cold, 
disinterested and emotionally sterile hollows. I have located and outlined a history of mid-
century modernist criticism and elaborated on how prevailing critical trends (exemplified by 
critics like Clement Greenberg) were focused on disembodied objectivity, while pointing to 
emerging critical modes that embrace subjectivity. In keeping with the theme of ambivalence, I 
have discussed both Sontag’s autobiographical urge – to construct her self in writing – as well 
as her desire to transcend the self through the text. Turning to performance theory, I have 
demonstrated how Sontag’s writing method utilized provisional tactics and aligned with identity-
formation theories that surfaced a few decades following the publication of the essays in Against 
Interpretation. Notably, the connection between Sontag’s use of Dexamyl as a writing stimulant 
and the phenomenological underpinnings of embodied writing has been discussed for the first 
time in an academic context here. In addition, I have explored the importance of an undercurrent 
of eroticism in Sontag’s texts, linking this to queer subcultures of the sixties, discourses of 
sexual identification and theoretical arguments about the societal and psychological functions of 
sex at the time.  
In a sense, this thesis has fulfilled a self-serving pedagogic function. From the beginning, 
the desire has been to inhabit writing, nest in one example and absorb its wisdom. Just as 
Sontag’s practice as a writer has been described in gustatory terms – she often alluded to her 
process of absorbing knowledge as cannibalistic or vampiric – my motivation here has always 
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been to quench a thirst for meaningful (tasty) prose in art’s nebula. As for the problems with 
contemporary art criticism set out in the introduction to this thesis, they persist. Empty words 
proliferate like weeds, but thoughtful words – nourished by precedents like Sontag – poke up 
above the soil, too. Indeed, Sontag is just one of many writers whose words about art are worth 
taking up residence in for a little while. It has been my desire with this thesis to simply provide 
pliable scaffolding on which to hang ideas about art writing, with the hope that we might learn 




































Figure 1: Cover of Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Dell 














Figure 2: Interior of Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Dell 





























Figure 3: Cover and Interior of Susan Sontag, “Against Interpretation”, Evergreen Review vol. 8, 









Figure 4: Diane Arbus, Writer Susan Sontag with her son David, N.Y.C. 1965, Gelatin silver 








        
Figure 5: Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes and his mother in Bayonne, circa 1923, in Mourning 
















Figure 6: Unidentified photographer, Jackson Pollock, Clement Greenberg, Helen 
Frankenthaler, Lee Krasner and an unidentified child at the beach, 1952. Photographic print, 9 x 
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